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On the morning of 31 January 1917, the Midlands town of Derby awoke to find itself the focal point of one of the most sensational developments of the First World War. Four members of a Derby family had been arrested and charged with conspiring to murder the Prime Minister, David Lloyd George, and a member of his War Cabinet, Arthur Henderson. The Old Bailey trial that followed gripped the nation. It turned out to be one of the blackest episodes in British political history - a provincial family had apparently been framed by a government desperate to discredit the pacifist movement. In this perceptive account of this disturbing case, Nicola Rippon describes in vivid detail the lives of Alice Wheeldon and her family, their extraordinary arrest and detention, and the conduct of the subsequent court case. She shows that, far from being potential murderers, the Wheeldons were almost certainly victims of a government plot aimed at discrediting the anti-war faction at a time when many people in Britain were beginning to turn against the conflict and question the justifications for it.

Had the Jack the Ripper murders taken place in 1988 not 1888 then our response to them would have been markedly different. Since those dark days in Victorian London we have learnt much about this type of killer: their damaged childhoods, misfit adulthoods and psychopathic alienation from the human race. But can this new knowledge help to solve a mystery that has been eluding generations of policemen and historians? William Beadle, using his Ripper psychological profile in conjunction with newly unearthed evidence, presents a compelling account with a fresh body of incrimination evidence that could finally answer the question of the true identity of the infamous Jack the Ripper.

Here is the dramatic story of Detective Richard Cain's criminal career, as revealed by his half-brother. Cain led a double life—one as a well known cop who led raids that landed on the front pages, and the other as a "made man" in one of Chicago's most notorious mafia crime families. Michael Cain weaves together years of research, interviews, family anecdotes, and rare documents to create a comprehensive biography of this complex, articulate, and self-contradictory criminal genius. In a story that reads like the plot of Martin Scorsese's The Departed, Cain played both ends against the middle to become a household name in Chicagoland and a notorious figure in both the Mob and the world of Chicago law enforcement. Eventually murdered in a café by two masked men wielding shotguns, he lived and died in a world of bloodshed and violence. Cain left behind a story so outlandish that he has even been accused of being involved in the assassination of President John F. Kennedy. Filled with fascinating and until-now unknown facts, The Tangled Web tells the full story of this one-man crime wave.

"JFK and Sam" is a tale of two murders. The first occurred in Dallas in 1963 and the second in Illinois in 1975. The first was ordered by Sam Giancana to avenge his betrayal by the Kennedys. Giancana had assured JFK's win in Illinois with the understanding that the new administration would go easy on the Chicago mob. Instead, Bobby Kennedy stepped up prosecutions. The second assassination was carried out by the CIA and the mob to prevent Giancana from testifying before the Church Committee hearings regarding his role in the CIA's plot to kill Fidel Castro. The irony is that both men were assassinated because of their relationship to each other and events that transpired from that relationship. "JFK and Sam" is unique from other books on the Kennedy assassination. Written by an insider with access to key figures, it names the assassins and traces the assassination team's movements in 1963. The first shot came from the Dal-Tex building (adjacent to the book depository) and struck Kennedy in the back of the neck. The second came from Giancana's driver who fired a CIA prototype handgun with a telescope (called a "fireball") from the grassy knoll, using a frangible bullet, which explains why there was such a massive wound to Kennedy's head. Lee Harvey Oswald was the fall guy and did not fire a weapon.

The death of the weapons inspector Dr David Kelly is considered by many to be "unfinished business". For this book, Norman Baker spent over a year in active research, receiving much new information from many sources. He shows that the Hutton inquiry verdict of suicide is not credible; he has the determination and courage to get to the truth of what really happened. "The Strange Death of David Kelly" looks in fascinating detail at the motives for the unlawful killing of Dr Kelly and the various possibilities of who could have been involved, before concluding with the most likely - but astonishing - scenario, revealed here for the first time. He analyses and criticises the official process after David Kelly's death, and looks into the actions of the UK government, particularly in relation to the Iraq war.

Commander Lionel 'Buster' Crabb was a British naval frogman who disappeared in 1956, under mysterious circumstances following a secret dive beneath a Russian warship bringing Soviet leaders Khruschev and Bulgarin to Britain. Now, fifty years after the event, Don Hale draws on exclusive interviews to tell the true story of Crabb's colourful life and who was behind his disappearance. Secret files documenting the event will not be released until 2057.

By 1700, London was the largest city in the world, with over 500,000 inhabitants. Very weakly policed, its streets saw regular outbreaks of rioting by a mob easily stirred by economic grievances, politics or religion. If the mob vented its anger more often on property than people, eighteenth-century Londoners frequently came to blows over personal disputes. In a society where men and women were quick to defend their honour, slanging matches easily turned to fisticuffs and slights on honour were avenged in duels. In this world, where the detection and prosecution of crime was the part of the business of the citizen, punishment, whether by the pillory, whipping at a cart's tail or hanging at Tyburn, was public and endorsed by crowds. The "London Mob: Violence and Disorder in Eighteenth-Century England" draws a fascinating portrait of the public life of the modern world's first great city.

The public execution at Tyburn is one of the most evocative and familiar of all eighteenth-century images. Whether it elicits horror or prurient fascination - or both - the Tyburn hanging day has become synonymous with the brutality of a bygone age and a legal system which valued property over human life.But, as this fascinating cultural and social history of the gallows reveals, the early modern execution was far more than just a debased spectator sport. The period between the Restoration and the American Revolution witnessed the rise and fall of a vast body of execution literature - last dying speeches and confessions, criminal trials and biographies - featuring the criminal as an Everyman (or Everywoman) holding up a mirror to the sins of his readers. The popularity of such publications reflected the widespread, and persistent, belief in the gallows as a literal preview of 'God's Tribunal': a sacred space in which solemn oaths, supernatural signs and, above all, courage, could trump the rulings of the secular courts. Here the condemned traitor, "game" highwayman, or model penitent could proclaim not only his or her innocence of a specific crime, but raise larger questions of relative societal guilt and social justice by invoking the disparity between man's justice and God's.

Tyburn Fields is the best known site of execution in London, but London may be aptly named the executioner's city, so many were the places where executions could and did occur. "London - The Executioner's City" reveals the capital as a place where the bodies of criminals defined the boundaries of the city and heads on poles greeted patrons on London Bridge. The ubiquity of crime and punishment was taken for granted by countless generations of the capital's inhabitants, though it seems to have done little to stem the tide of criminality that has always threatened to engulf the city. The book is a powerful evocation of the dark side of London's history, where the great and not so good, the poor and helpless, the cruel and the idealistic crowd together to be punished in public. A King and more than one Queen, heretics, archbishops, pirates, poisoners, plotters, murderers and a cook executed for selling putrid fish met death by hanging, beheading, burning or boiling in London, and on most occasions the crowd roared its approval. David Brandon and Alan Brooke's book is a vivid picture of capital punishment in a capital that seems to have thrived on executions.

Fascination with murder is not a modern phenomenon. People in the past were just as interested in extreme violence and homicide as people nowadays. In seventeenth-century England all excessive and gratuitous violence was condemned and prosecuted, with murderers being categorized as particularly wicked. The courtrooms where murderers were tried were packed and crowds attended their execution. Ballads about notorious cases and prints reflected the huge interest such cases generated. Yet, in a world with no police and little forensic expertise, identification, pursuit and prosecution presented many difficulties. "Murder in Shakespeare's England" looks at a series of murder cases, ranging from brawls to infanticide, and including serial and sex killings, to paint a picture of how murder was committed, discovered and punished in Stuart England.

Caroline Luard was shot near Ightham in Kent in 1908. Within weeks, her husband, the respectable Major-General Charles Luard, committed suicide. It was rumoured that he killed himself following a tip-off from the local chief constable that he was about to be arrested. In 1910, John Nisbet, a colliery cashier, was robbed and murdered on a train in Northumberland. Three days after the crime, police arrested a man called John Dickman, who was subsequently executed. The conviction, however, relied on circumstantial evidence. In 1950, C. H. Norman, who acted as official shorthand writer at Dickman's trial, claimed that Dickman was framed for Nisbet's murder, because the judge and prosecuting council believed him guilty of the murder of Caroline Luard. Is it conceivable that John Dickman was guilty of both murders? Or was he framed, and unjustly executed? This new book provides the definitive account of both murders. Including previously unpublished evidence, it is a compelling read, vividly recreating the atmosphere of the Edwardian age. These true crimes bear all the hallmarks of traditional English period murder: steam trains, revolvers, an isolated summerhouse, retired army officers, parlour maids, to say nothing of conspiracy theories, murder, suicide, an execution and a love story.

The detective is a familiar figure in British history, from the Victorian truncheon-bearing bobby to the undercover sleuth of the twenty-first century. But there is much in the history of our investigative police force that remains in the dark. Using detective training manuals, Home Office enquiries, Parliamentary papers and unpublished memoirs of retired detectives, Stephen Wade looks at famous cases such as the Ripper murders and the beginnings of the Special Branch and Detective Branch of Scotland Yard. His fascinating history covers aspects of crime history that have not yet been written about, including the career of Jim 'the Penman' Saward, a notorious forger, the detectives who were corrupted during the hunt for him and the infamous Trial of the Detectives of 1876 - a massive corruption trial involving six Scotland Yard detectives. It was this that led to the creation of a professional Scotland Yard as we know it today. Appealing to criminologists, social and crime historians and, most significantly, readers of crime fiction and true crime, this new history is a vital part of our crime heritage.


17 - Crime and Punishment in the Russian Empire

The chapter explores how, as an ‘empire of difference’, Russia from the sixteenth to the eighteenth centuries tolerated local law for lesser crimes among the empire’s diverse peoples but insisted on the tsar’s law for high crimes (murder, recidivist robbery and theft, treason and heresy and the like). The bureaucracy established a remarkable uniformity of documentary form, judicial procedure and legal norms across the empire. In local courts knowledgeable scribes, in the absence of a professional bar, juridical faculties and notaries advised governors who were untrained amateurs. Lacking jurisprudential expertise, criminal codes were laconic, workaday compendia of fines and penalties primarily intended to police official corruption. Punishment was primarily corporal, but in local courts violence was mitigated by judges’ use of mercy to preserve community stability and by their reliance on locals to staff court and executioners’ roles. Violence, in torture and corporal and capital punishment, escalated in the prosecution of highest crime (treason, heresy), but Muscovy did not conduct European-style theatrical spectacles of suffering until Peter I witnessed them in the 1690s. Even so, from the late 1600s Russia relied increasingly on exile and abolished capital punishment for all crimes but treason by the end of the eighteenth century.

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Building on the excellent critical editions and studies by Russian scholars are recent translations of the most important early modern Russian law codes: Kaiser , Daniel H. (trans. and ed.), The Laws of Rus’ – Tenth to Fifteenth Centuries ( Salt Lake City, UT : Charles Schlacks Jr , 1992 ) Dewey , Horace W. (comp., ed. and trans.), Muscovite Judicial Texts, 1488–1556 , Michigan Slavic Materials 7 ( Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan, Department of Slavic Languages and Literatures , 1966 ) Hellie , Richard (trans. and ed.), The Muscovite Law Code (Ulozhenie) of 1649. Part 1: Text and Translation ( Irvine, CA Charles Schlacks Jr , 1988 ) .

Sixteenth- and seventeenth-century Russian law is well served in English-language literature, and these articles are representative of the leading authors’ work: Dewey , Horace W. , ‘ The 1550 Sudebnik as an Instrument of Reform ’, Jahrbücher für Geschichte Osteuropas 10 . 2 ( 1962 ), 161–80 Kleimola , Ann M. , Justice in Medieval Russia: Muscovite Judgment Charters (pravye gramoty) of the Fifteenth and Sixteenth Centuries ( Philadelphia : American Philosophical Society , 1975 ) Hellie , Richard , ‘ Early Modern Russian Law: The Ulozhenie of 1649 ’, Russian History 15 . 2–4 ( 1988 ), 155–80 Kaiser , Daniel H. , The Growth of the Law in Medieval Russia ( Princeton, NJ : Princeton University Press , 1980 ) Weickhardt , George G. , ‘ Due Process and Equal Justice in the Muscovite Codes ’, Russian Review 51 . 4 ( 1992 ), 463–80 .

For the eighteenth century, Anisimov , Evgenii accents state violence in, for example, Dyba i knut. Politicheskii sysk i russkoe obshchestvo v XVIII veke (Rack and Knout. Political Trials and Russian Society in the Eighteenth Century) ( Moscow : Novoe literaturnoe obozrenie , 1999 ) and Shrader , Abby explores the elimination of corporal punishment in Languages of the Lash: Corporal Punishment and Identity in Imperial Russia ( DeKalb : Northern Illinois University Press , 2002 ) .

Studies based on case law through the seventeenth century include Kollmann , Nancy S. on litigations over honour in By Honor Bound. State and Society in Early Modern Russia ( Ithaca, NY : Cornell University Press , 1999 ) and on the criminal law in Crime and Punishment in Early Modern Russia ( Cambridge : Cambridge University Press , 2012 ) . Kivelson , Valerie A. explores witchcraft prosecutions and the role of torture in Desperate Magic: The Moral Economy of Witchcraft in Seventeenth-Century Russia ( Ithaca , NY: Cornell University Press , 2013 ) . Local government is explored in Davies , Brian L. , State Power and Community in Early Modern Russia ( New York : Palgrave Macmillan , 2004 ) and Glaz’ev , V. N. , Vlast’ i obshchestvo na iuge Rossii v XVII veke: Protivodeistvie ugolovnoi prestupnosti (Power and Society in Southern Russia in the Seventeenth Century. Fighting Felony Crime) ( Voronezh : Izd. Voronezhskogo gosud. universiteta , 2001 ) .

For the eighteenth century, Golikova , N. B. explores political trials in Politicheskie protsessy pri Petre I: po materialam Preobrazhenskogo prikaza (Political Trials under Peter I: Based on the Materials of the Preobrazhenskii Chancery) ( Moscow : Izd. Moskovskogo universiteta , 1957 ) . Prosecutions of witchcraft and other spiritual crimes are the focus of Smilianskaia , Elena , Volshebniki. Bogokhul’niki. Eretiki (Magicians. Blasphemers. Heretics) ( Moscow : Izd. Indrik , 2003 ) and Lavrov , A. S. , Koldovstvo i religiiia v Rossii. 1700–1740 gg . (Witchcraft and Religion in Russia 1700–1740) ( Moscow : Drevlekhranilishche , 2000 ) . Schmidt , Christoph explores crime in Moscow in Sozialkontrolle in Moskau: Justiz, Kriminalität und Leibeigenschaft, 1649–1785 ( Stuttgart : F. Steiner , 1996 ) , while Gentes , Andrew A. examines the exile system in Exile to Siberia, 1590–1822 ( London : Palgrave Macmillan , 2008 ) . Hoch , Steven L. shows how peasant communes practised a tyranny of the old men over women and young men in Serfdom and Social Control in Russia. Petrovskoe , A Village in Tambov ( Chicago : University of Chicago Press , 1986 ) .

The bureaucracy, so crucial to the functioning of the judicial system, is the focus of important studies. Representative of Brown , Peter B. ’s many articles is ‘ Neither Fish nor Fowl: Administrative Legality in Mid- and Late-Seventeenth-Century Russia ’, Jahrbücher für Geschichte Osteuropas 50 ( 2002 ), 1 – 21 , while Plavsic , Borivoj describes training and career paths in ‘ Seventeenth-Century Chanceries and Their Staffs ’, in Pintner , Walter M. and Karl Rowney , Don (eds.), Russian Officialdom: The Bureaucratization of Russian Society from the Seventeenth to the Twentieth Century ( Chapel Hill : University of North Carolina Press , 1980 ), pp. 19 – 45 . Troitskii , S. M. pioneered the collective prosopography of bureaucrats in Russkii absoliutizm i dvorianstvo v XVIII v. Formirovanie biurokratii (Russian Absolutism and Nobility in the Eighteenth Century. The Formation of the Bureaucracy) ( Moscow : Nauka , 1974 ) Demidova , N. F. applied this approach to the earlier period in Sluzhilaia biurokratiia v Rossii XVII v. i ee rol’ v formirovanii absoliutizma (The Serving Bureaucracy in Russia in the Seventeenth Century and its Role in the Formation of Absolutism) ( Moscow : Nauka , 1987 ) . Pisar’kova , L. F. , Gosudarstvennoe upravlenie Rossii s kontsa XVII do kontsa XVIII veka. Evoliutsiia biurokraticheskoi sistemy (State Administration in Russia from the End of the Seventeenth to the End of the Eighteenth Century. The Evolution of the Bureaucratic System) ( Moscow : ROSSPEN , 2007 ) expands their findings.

Some American scholars have construed Russia as a despotism or emphasised the brutality of public life: see Michels , Georg , ‘ The Violent Old Belief: An Examination of Religious Dissent on the Karelian Frontier ’, Russian History 19 . 1–4 ( 1992 ), 203–30 Poe , Marshall , A People Born to Slavery’: Russia in Early Modern European Ethnography, 1476–1748 ( Ithaca, NY : Cornell University Press , 2000 ) . Others argue that court politics was based on ‘consensus’ between ruler and the great clans and that overall governance followed a ‘politics of difference’: see Keenan , Edward L. , ‘ Muscovite Political Folkways ’, Russian Review 45 . 2 ( 1986 ), 115–81 Kivelson , Valerie A. , ‘ The Devil Stole His Mind: The Tsar and the 1648 Moscow Uprising ’, American Historical Review 98 . 3 ( 1993 ), 733–56 Kollmann , Nancy S. , Kinship and Politics: The Making of the Muscovite Political System, 1345–1547 ( Stanford, CA : Stanford University Press , 1987 ) and her The Russian Empire 1450–1801 ( Oxford : Oxford University Press , 2017 ) .

On eighteenth-century moral philosophy and political views, see Wirtschafter , Elise Kimmerling , Religion and Enlightenment in Catherinian Russia: The Teachings of Metropolitan Platon ( DeKalb : Northern Illinois University Press , 2013 ) and Whittaker , Cynthia H. , Russian Monarchy: Eighteenth-Century Rulers and Writers in Political Dialogue ( DeKalb : Northern Illinois University Press , 2003 ) . Le Donne , John ’s in-depth studies of Catherine II’s administrative and judicial reforms include Absolutism and Ruling Class: The Formation of the Russian Political Order, 1700–1825 ( New York and Oxford : Oxford University Press , 1991 ) .


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Feb. 19, 2015
SHSU Media Contact: Julia May

CJ professor Mitchel Roth has added another book to the collection of those he has penned over the years. This one delves into the crime and punishment across the world and throughout the ages. &mdash Photo by Brian Blalock

While recent news of beheadings, mass murders and suicide bombings is difficult to escape, mankind is actually living in the safest time.

That&rsquos according to Mitchel P. Roth, a criminal justice and criminology professor at Sam Houston State University, and he should know&mdashhe has spent hundreds of hours researching the subject for his most recent book, "An Eye For An Eye: A Global History Of Crime And Punishment."

&ldquoWhat distinguishes this from other books that have been written on the history of crime and punishment is that my new book is the first one to look at the subject globally from a non-Western perspective,&rdquo he said.

More information is available about Western crime and punishment, Roth says, not only because that is the time from which we have the first written records, but also because prior to European colonization there is little in the way of historical records from broad swathes of the world. Roth noted that even in the 21st century there are many countries that do not share information about crime and punishment.

According to Roth, crime and punishment have always been part of the human condition, writing, &ldquoSince time immemorial, humans seem to have had a natural pre-disposition for committing mayhem and coming up with novel sanctions to punish those who perpetrated the acts. In fact, it often seems that we are as hardwired for violence as we are for empathy.&rdquo

Going back thousands of years to crimes in cultures that existed before written law, Roth provides examples of justice served by the community before governments were formed.

&ldquoAt one time, you were punished because your infraction was a threat to the community,&rdquo he said. &ldquoFor instance, that&rsquos the foundation of stoning as a form of capital punishment. Because you disrupted the order of the community, the community put you to death, protecting the individual from the shedding of tribal blood.&rdquo

Roth also discusses how societies developed methods of punishment that were aligned with their cultural beliefs, such as the exhibitory public punishments in Asia.

&ldquoNo form of death was more feared than one that interfered with the somatic integrity of the body,&rdquo Roth said. &ldquoThus, the ultimate punishment consisted of beheading in China, often along with other mutilations, since it was believed that the body needed to be buried intact for the soul to make the proper passage.&rdquo

Roth&rsquos book also chronicles the transformation of punishment and the development of the modern penitentiary. His research shows that as governments became more centrally established and countries adopted the prison system, there was a tendency to move beyond public capital and corporal punishment.

&ldquoDuring the time of the Bloody Code of England, approximately 200 to 300 offenses carried the death penalty. As the justice system evolved in England, rather than sentence so many to death, the courts began using transportation to the New World and Australia as an alternative means of punishment,&rdquo he said.

&ldquoThe whole idea of the progression of the justice system is not to punish harsher, but to punish better,&rdquo he said.

In fact, most forms of execution have become more humane over the last few hundred years.

&ldquoFrom the Athenian use of the poison hemlock and simple beheading, to the technological marvels of the guillotine, the electric chair, and gas chamber, and now lethal injection, penal reformers have played an important role in determining how we execute the supposedly worst among us,&rdquo he said.

&ldquoThe modern world has even intruded into some of the more archaic penal sanctions in use today,&rdquo he said. &ldquoIn Saudi Arabia and in other countries heavily influenced by Sharia law, criminals are often tranquillized before being beheaded in a public square while those facing amputations might be anesthetized prior to public amputation of a limb.&rdquo

Except for the Aztecs, whose punishment of those in the higher rank was more severe because they were held to higher standards, Roth found that a common thread through the ages and through different cultures is that &ldquoit&rsquos always good to be wealthy.&rdquo

&ldquoOne of the major themes relates to how high you were born in society,&rdquo he said. &ldquoOften times, and even today, your punishment depended on if you were a member of the upper class or the lower class, and also the socio-economic status of the victim. Historically punishment has been much worse for a poor person who commits a crime against a wealthy person, than for a wealthy person who commits a crime against a poor person. That dates back to ancient Mesopotamian law and the Code of Hammurabi, which favored property owners and was much harsher to the lower classes.&rdquo

Other constants include the fact that perpetrators of crime, particularly violent crime, have overwhelmingly been young males over the centuries, and the most severe punishments were directed at them as well.

Roth also discusses the role of colonialism and how it shaped different types of punishment throughout the world, the rise of the penitentiary, organized crime and the globalization of criminality.

He also devotes one chapter to murder.

&ldquoMurder is probably the one crime most written about and the least likely to happen in your lifetime,&rdquo he said. &ldquoBut the way we kill each other and murder rates tell us a lot about a culture. Murder is a social relationship&mdashtwo people interacting, even if it&rsquos just for a moment.

&ldquoI also discuss serial homicide and mass murder, because that seems to be where all the fascination is, although it is extremely rare, he said.

&ldquoEvidence suggests that serial and sexually motivated murder have always been part of the human experience. One needs look no further than fairy tales, stories of witchcraft and the purported existence of werewolves and vampires over the centuries,&rdquo he said. &ldquoFrom Africa to Western Europe, such stories were probably inspired by actual mutilation murders in a time of superstition before the birth of modern policing and forensic investigation.&rdquo

Roth admits that the book won&rsquot be everyone&rsquos &ldquocup of tea,&rdquo because of its gruesome and gory details.

However, the book should appeal to those interested in criminology, the justice system, sociology and history.

&ldquoDespite amazing advances on every level of the human experience, there is a remarkable continuity in what crimes are committed as well as the sanctions used to punish them,&rdquo he said. &ldquoAlthough the means for committing crimes are quite different in the digital, post-industrial world, the goals and motivations of criminals and criminal justice systems have not strayed too far from their antecedents.

&ldquoUltimately, &lsquoAn Eye for an Eye&rsquo demonstrates that the history of crime and punishment remains an inconsistent chronicle of experimentation&mdashborrowing, adapting and finding new alternatives&mdashoften finding penal officials going back to history books to retool ancient sanctions for a new world,&rdquo he said.

"An Eye for an Eye: A Global History of Crime and Punishment" is published by Reaktion Books in the United Kingdom and distributed by the University of Chicago Press in the United States. It is available through both publishing houses and from booksellers online, such as Amazon.

A review of the book by former Los Angeles County District Attorney Gil Garcetti was recently published in the Feb. 8 Los Angeles Review of Books.

Roth has just completed another book, "Convict Cowboys: The Untold History of the Texas Prison Rodeo, The Wildest Show on Earth," which he expects will be published sometime during the next year.

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Women, Crime and Punishment in Ireland

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Book description

Focusing on women's relationships, decisions and agency, this is the first study of women's experiences in a nineteenth-century Irish prison for serious offenders. Showcasing the various crimes for which women were incarcerated in the post-Famine period, from repeated theft to murder, Elaine Farrell examines inmate files in close detail in order to understand women's lives before, during and after imprisonment. By privileging case studies and individual narratives, this innovative study reveals imprisoned women's relationships with each other, with the staff employed to manage and control them, and with their relatives, spouses, children and friends who remained on the outside. In doing so, Farrell illuminates the hardships many women experienced, their poverty and survival strategies, as well as their responsibilities, obligations, and decisions. Incorporating women's own voices, gleaned from letters and prison files, this intimate insight into individual women's lives in an Irish prison sheds new light on collective female experiences across urban and rural post-Famine Ireland.

Reviews

‘The first comprehensive analysis of incarcerated women in Irish history, this book is nothing short of path breaking. Persuasive, innovative, and convincing, Farrell's book integrates the history of institutions in Ireland - a current fascination of many - with astute analyses of gender and sexuality, 'deviance' and criminality, and bodies and emotions. In the hands of this skilful historian, the daily struggles and triumphs of ordinary if 'outcast' women in the past come alive, providing essential context for discussions of gender in Irish life today.’

Cara Delay - College of Charleston

‘This work is a microcosm of nineteenth century Irish society dealing with gender, class, religion, poverty, and emigration. By reconstructing the experience of the female prisoner, her family and friends and the female staff within the prison system, it offers a new understanding of crime and punishment at the time.’

Bernadette Whelan - University of Limerick

‘The merit of this work, when reviewed within our long tradition of top-down historical writing, is the fact that the extraordinary exists merely in the ordinary.’


The Punishment Is the Crime

Nine years ago, Ronald Washington swiped two Michael Jordan jerseys from a Foot Locker in Shreveport, Louisiana. Although the shirts were on sale for $45 each, they were officially priced at $60, putting their combined value above $100. The difference between the discounted price and the list price was the difference between a misdemeanor punishable by no more than six months in jail and a felony that triggered a life sentence.

Washington is one of the prisoners profiled in a new report from the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) on nonviolent offenders serving sentences of life without parole (LWOP). There were at least 3,278 such prisoners in the U.S. at the end of 2012, an astonishing number that reflects decades of tough-on-crime policies unconstrained by justice, wisdom, or compassion.

Like many of those prisoners, Washington qualified as a "habitual offender" under a law aimed at incorrigible criminals. But if none of his prior offenses—which included forgery, cocaine possession, theft, and burglary—merited a life sentence, it is hard to see how the addition of shoplifting could possibly justify that penalty.

If Washington's punishment was grossly disproportionate, how should we describe the life sentences imposed on repeat offenders whose so-called crimes involved no victims? At the age of 28, James R. Byers Jr. was sentenced to life under South Carolina's "three strikes" law for a single $10 crack sale all his prior convictions involved drug offenses.

Kevin Ott was 33 when he began serving a life sentence in Oklahoma for possessing three-and-a-half ounces of methamphetamine while on parole for marijuana charges. Three marijuana offenses, the last involving less than two pounds, triggered a life sentence for 35-year-old Cornell Hood II under Louisiana's habitual offender law.

Nearly two-thirds of the LWOP prisoners counted by the ACLU are in the federal system, almost all of them for drug offenses that are punished according to rigid formulas based on weight and criminal history. That's how Timothy Tyler ended up with a life sentence for selling LSD to fellow Deadheads after getting probation for two similar offenses. He was 24 when the government permanently stripped him of his freedom.

Even drug offenders without prior convictions can be sent to prison for the rest of their lives. When she was 26, Teresa Griffin was sentenced to life in federal prison for serving as a mule in her boyfriend's cocaine operation. Alice Marie Johnson got the same sentence when she was 42 for holding money and passing along messages as part of a cocaine distribution conspiracy. Both were first-time offenders.

The ACLU's report does not include people serving lengthy mandatory terms that amount to life sentences—such as Weldon Angelos, who is serving a 55-year sentence in federal prison for possessing a gun during three marijuana sales, or Morton Berger, who is serving a 200-year sentence in Arizona for possessing child pornography. Prisoners like Berger would not have been counted anyway, since the ACLU excluded sex offenders.

Furthermore, three states with nonviolent offenders serving LWOP sentences—Delaware, Nevada, and Virginia—did not provide data. Hence the ACLU's grim tally, appalling as it is, understates the number of people unjustly condemned to spend the rest of their lives in cages.

"Today," the ACLU notes, "the United States is virtually alone in its willingness to sentence nonviolent offenders to die behind bars." It urges state and federal legislators to abolish that practice and make the change retroactive so that current prisoners will be eligible for resentencing. In the meantime, it says, governors and the president should use their clemency powers, which they have exercised in recent years with scandalous infrequency, to free people who never should have received life sentences.

The ACLU also suggests that legislators "recalibrate drug policies." Since four-fifths of the people serving LWOP sentences for nonviolent crimes are drug offenders, more than a tweak may be needed. But we could start by recognizing that murdering someone is worse than selling him drugs.


Crime and Punishment Summary & Study Guide Description

Crime and Punishment Summary & Study Guide includes comprehensive information and analysis to help you understand the book. This study guide contains the following sections:

This detailed literature summary also contains Bibliography and a Free Quiz on Crime and Punishment by Fyodor Dostoevsky.

When the first installment of Crime and Punishment appeared in the Journal Russian Messenger in January of 1866, its debt-ridden author, Fyodor Mikhallovich Dostoyevsky, had not yet finished writing the novel. However, even before the entire work had appeared in serial form, the novel was a public success. Early Russian readers and critics recognized that, artistically and socially, Crime and Punishment was one of the most important novels of its time, and it was widely discussed.

On the surface, Crime and Punishment is the story of a murder, set in the city of St. Petersburg, then the Russian capital. It is not, however, a murder mystery: we know the murderer's Identity from the very beginning. Moreover, although Dostoyevsky depicts the crime and the environment in which It takes place with great realism, he is more interested in the psychology of the murderer than in the external specifics of the crime.

Like many of the great nineteenth-century novelists, Dostoyevsky often uses a series of incredible coincidences to move the plot forward. Nonetheless, the story takes on a compelling life of its own. Dostoyevsky's use of parable and of dream sequences is also original and remarkable. Furthermore, Dostoyevsky creates a gallery of memorable characters, including the proud and tormented ex-student Raskolnikov and his two murder victims the drunken civil servant Marmeladov and his daughter, the meek prostitute Sonya, whose love helps to redeem Raskolnikov Raskolnikov's devoted sister, mother, and best friend (Dunya, pulkheria Aleksandrovna, and Razhumikhin) Dunya's scheming suitor Luzhin and the sinister Svidrigailov and the canny police investigator, Portiry Petrovich. Finally, beyond its powerful plot and colorful characters, Crime and Punishment is marked by its insightful treatment of several major themes. Among other things, the book is an expose of social conditions in nineteenth-century Russia, a satirical analysis of liberal and radical politics, and a religious call for redemption through suffering. As an intensely dramatic study of the nature of good and evil, it is commonly considered the quintessential Russian novel.


2018 Chapter 5

For certain categories of offenses and offenders, the guidelines permit the court to impose either imprisonment or some other sanction or combination of sanctions. In determining the type of sentence to impose, the sentencing judge should consider the nature and seriousness of the conduct, the statutory purposes of sentencing, and the pertinent offender characteristics. A sentence is within the guidelines if it complies with each applicable section of this chapter. The court should impose a sentence sufficient, but not greater than necessary, to comply with the statutory purposes of sentencing. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a).

Historical Note: Effective November 1, 1987.

PART A - SENTENCING TABLE

The Sentencing Table used to determine the guideline range follows:

Commentary to Sentencing Table

1. The Offense Level (1-43) forms the vertical axis of the Sentencing Table. The Criminal History Category (I-VI) forms the horizontal axis of the Table. The intersection of the Offense Level and Criminal History Category displays the Guideline Range in months of imprisonment. "Life" means life imprisonment. For example, the guideline range applicable to a defendant with an Offense Level of 15 and a Criminal History Category of III is 24-30 months of imprisonment.

2. In rare cases, a total offense level of less than 1 or more than 43 may result from application of the guidelines. A total offense level of less than 1 is to be treated as an offense level of 1. An offense level of more than 43 is to be treated as an offense level of 43.

3. The Criminal History Category is determined by the total criminal history points from Chapter Four, Part A, except as provided in §§4B1.1 (Career Offender) and 4B1.4 (Armed Career Criminal). The total criminal history points associated with each Criminal History Category are shown under each Criminal History Category in the Sentencing Table.

Historical Note: Effective November 1, 1987. Amended effective November 1, 1989 (amendment 270) November 1, 1991 (amendment 418) November 1, 1992 (amendment 462) November 1, 2010 (amendment 738).

PART B - PROBATION

The Comprehensive Crime Control Act of 1984 makes probation a sentence in and of itself. 18 U.S.C. § 3561. Probation may be used as an alternative to incarceration, provided that the terms and conditions of probation can be fashioned so as to meet fully the statutory purposes of sentencing, including promoting respect for law, providing just punishment for the offense, achieving general deterrence, and protecting the public from further crimes by the defendant.

Historical Note: Effective November 1, 1987.

§5B1.1. Imposition of a Term of Probation

(a) Subject to the statutory restrictions in subsection (b) below, a sentence of probation is authorized if:

(1) the applicable guideline range is in Zone A of the Sentencing Table or

(2) the applicable guideline range is in Zone B of the Sentencing Table and the court imposes a condition or combination of conditions requiring intermittent confinement, community confinement, or home detention as provided in subsection (c)(3) of §5C1.1 (Imposition of a Term of Imprisonment).

(b) A sentence of probation may not be imposed in the event:

(1) the offense of conviction is a Class A or B felony, 18 U.S.C. § 3561(a)(1)

(2) the offense of conviction expressly precludes probation as a sentence, 18 U.S.C. § 3561(a)(2)

(3) the defendant is sentenced at the same time to a sentence of imprisonment for the same or a different offense, 18 U.S.C. § 3561(a)(3).

1. Except where prohibited by statute or by the guideline applicable to the offense in Chapter Two, the guidelines authorize, but do not require, a sentence of probation in the following circumstances:

(A) Where the applicable guideline range is in Zone A of the Sentencing Table (i.e., the minimum term of imprisonment specified in the applicable guideline range is zero months). In such cases, a condition requiring a period of community confinement, home detention, or intermittent confinement may be imposed but is not required.

(B) Where the applicable guideline range is in Zone B of the Sentencing Table (i.e., the minimum term of imprisonment specified in the applicable guideline range is at least one but not more than nine months). In such cases, the court may impose probation only if it imposes a condition or combination of conditions requiring a period of community confinement, home detention, or intermittent confinement sufficient to satisfy the minimum term of imprisonment specified in the guideline range. For example, where the offense level is 7 and the criminal history category is II, the guideline range from the Sentencing Table is 2-8 months. In such a case, the court may impose a sentence of probation only if it imposes a condition or conditions requiring at least two months of community confinement, home detention, or intermittent confinement, or a combination of community confinement, home detention, and intermittent confinement totaling at least two months.

2. Where the applicable guideline range is in Zone C or D of the Sentencing Table (i.e., the minimum term of imprisonment specified in the applicable guideline range is ten months or more), the guidelines do not authorize a sentence of probation. See §5C1.1 (Imposition of a Term of Imprisonment).

Background: This section provides for the imposition of a sentence of probation. The court may sentence a defendant to a term of probation in any case unless (1) prohibited by statute, or (2) where a term of imprisonment is required under §5C1.1 (Imposition of a Term of Imprisonment). Under 18 U.S.C. § 3561(a)(3), the imposition of a sentence of probation is prohibited where the defendant is sentenced at the same time to a sentence of imprisonment for the same or a different offense. Although this provision has effectively abolished the use of "split sentences" imposable pursuant to the former 18 U.S.C. § 3651, the drafters of the Sentencing Reform Act noted that the functional equivalent of the split sentence could be "achieved by a more direct and logically consistent route" by providing that a defendant serve a term of imprisonment followed by a period of supervised release. (S. Rep. No. 225, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 89 (1983)). Section 5B1.1(a)(2) provides a transition between the circumstances under which a "straight" probationary term is authorized and those where probation is prohibited.

Historical Note: Effective November 1, 1987. Amended effective November 1, 1989 (amendments 271 and 302) November 1, 1992 (amendment 462) November 1, 2010 (amendments 738 and 747).

§5B1.2. Term of Probation

(a) When probation is imposed, the term shall be:

(1) at least one year but not more than five years if the offense level is 6 or greater

(2) no more than three years in any other case.

Background: This section governs the length of a term of probation. Subject to statutory restrictions, the guidelines provide that a term of probation may not exceed three years if the offense level is less than 6. If a defendant has an offense level of 6 or greater, the guidelines provide that a term of probation be at least one year but not more than five years. Although some distinction in the length of a term of probation is warranted based on the circumstances of the case, a term of probation may also be used to enforce conditions such as fine or restitution payments, or attendance in a program of treatment such as drug rehabilitation. Often, it may not be possible to determine the amount of time required for the satisfaction of such payments or programs in advance. This issue has been resolved by setting forth two broad ranges for the duration of a term of probation depending upon the offense level. Within the guidelines set forth in this section, the determination of the length of a term of probation is within the discretion of the sentencing judge.

Historical Note: Effective November 1, 1987.

§5B1.3. Conditions of Probation

(1) For any offense, the defendant shall not commit another federal, state or local offense (see 18 U.S.C. § 3563(a)).

(2) For a felony, the defendant shall (A) make restitution, (B) work in community service, or (C) both, unless the court has imposed a fine, or unless the court finds on the record that extraordinary circumstances exist that would make such a condition plainly unreasonable, in which event the court shall impose one or more of the discretionary conditions set forth under 18 U.S.C. § 3563(b) (see 18 U.S.C. § 3563(a)(2)).

(3) For any offense, the defendant shall not unlawfully possess a controlled substance (see 18 U.S.C. § 3563(a)).

(4) For a domestic violence crime as defined in 18 U.S.C. § 3561(b) by a defendant convicted of such an offense for the first time, the defendant shall attend a public, private, or non-profit offender rehabilitation program that has been approved by the court, in consultation with a State Coalition Against Domestic Violence or other appropriate experts, if an approved program is available within a 50-mile radius of the legal residence of the defendant (see 18 U.S.C. § 3563(a)).

(5) For any offense, the defendant shall refrain from any unlawful use of a controlled substance and submit to one drug test within 15 days of release on probation and at least two periodic drug tests thereafter (as determined by the court) for use of a controlled substance, but the condition stated in this paragraph may be ameliorated or suspended by the court for any individual defendant if the defendant's presentence report or other reliable information indicates a low risk of future substance abuse by the defendant (see 18 U.S.C. § 3563(a)).

(6) The defendant shall (A) make restitution in accordance with 18 U.S.C. §§ 2248, 2259, 2264, 2327, 3663, 3663A, and 3664 and (B) pay the assessment imposed in accordance with 18 U.S.C. § 3013. If there is a courtestablished payment schedule for making restitution or paying the assessment (see 18 U.S.C. § 3572(d)), the defendant shall adhere to the schedule.

(7) The defendant shall notify the court of any material change in the defendant's economic circumstances that might affect the defendant's ability to pay restitution, fines, or special assessments (see 18 U.S.C. § 3563(a)).

(8) If the court has imposed a fine, the defendant shall pay the fine or adhere to a court-established payment schedule (see 18 U.S.C. § 3563(a)).

(9) If the defendant is required to register under the Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act, the defendant shall comply with the requirements of that Act (see 18 U.S.C. § 3563(a)).

(10) The defendant shall submit to the collection of a DNA sample from the defendant at the direction of the United States Probation Office if the collection of such a sample is authorized pursuant to section 3 of the DNA Analysis Backlog Elimination Act of 2000 (34 U.S.C. § 40702).

(b) Discretionary Conditions

The court may impose other conditions of probation to the extent that such conditions (1) are reasonably related to (A) the nature and circumstances of the offense and the history and characteristics of the defendant (B) the need for the sentence imposed to reflect the seriousness of the offense, to promote respect for the law, and to provide just punishment for the offense (C) the need for the sentence imposed to afford adequate deterrence to criminal conduct (D) the need to protect the public from further crimes of the defendant and (E) the need to provide the defendant with needed educational or vocational training, medical care, or other correctional treatment in the most effective manner and (2) involve only such deprivations of liberty or property as are reasonably necessary for the purposes of sentencing indicated in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) (see 18 U.S.C. § 3563(b)).

(c) "Standard" Conditions (Policy Statement)

The following "standard" conditions are recommended for probation. Several of the conditions are expansions of the conditions required by statute:

(1) The defendant shall report to the probation office in the federal judicial district where he or she is authorized to reside within 72 hours of the time the defendant was sentenced, unless the probation officer instructs the defendant to report to a different probation office or within a different time frame.

(2) After initially reporting to the probation office, the defendant will receive instructions from the court or the probation officer about how and when to report to the probation officer, and the defendant shall report to the probation officer as instructed.

(3) The defendant shall not knowingly leave the federal judicial district where he or she is authorized to reside without first getting permission from the court or the probation officer.

(4) The defendant shall answer truthfully the questions asked by the probation officer.

(5) The defendant shall live at a place approved by the probation officer. If the defendant plans to change where he or she lives or anything about his or her living arrangements (such as the people the defendant lives with), the defendant shall notify the probation officer at least 10 days before the change. If notifying the probation officer at least 10 days in advance is not possible due to unanticipated circumstances, the defendant shall notify the probation officer within 72 hours of becoming aware of a change or expected change.

(6) The defendant shall allow the probation officer to visit the defendant at any time at his or her home or elsewhere, and the defendant shall permit the probation officer to take any items prohibited by the conditions of the defendant's supervision that he or she observes in plain view.

(7) The defendant shall work full time (at least 30 hours per week) at a lawful type of employment, unless the probation officer excuses the defendant from doing so. If the defendant does not have full-time employment he or she shall try to find full-time employment, unless the probation officer excuses the defendant from doing so. If the defendant plans to change where the defendant works or anything about his or her work (such as the position or the job responsibilities), the defendant shall notify the probation officer at least 10 days before the change. If notifying the probation officer at least 10 days in advance is not possible due to unanticipated circumstances, the defendant shall notify the probation officer within 72 hours of becoming aware of a change or expected change.

(8) The defendant shall not communicate or interact with someone the defendant knows is engaged in criminal activity. If the defendant knows someone has been convicted of a felony, the defendant shall not knowingly communicate or interact with that person without first getting the permission of the probation officer.

(9) If the defendant is arrested or questioned by a law enforcement officer, the defendant shall notify the probation officer within 72 hours.

(10) The defendant shall not own, possess, or have access to a firearm, ammunition, destructive device, or dangerous weapon (i.e., anything that was designed, or was modified for, the specific purpose of causing bodily injury or death to another person, such as nunchakus or tasers).

(11) The defendant shall not act or make any agreement with a law enforcement agency to act as a confidential human source or informant without first getting the permission of the court.

(12) If the probation officer determines that the defendant poses a risk to another person (including an organization), the probation officer may require the defendant to notify the person about the risk and the defendant shall comply with that instruction. The probation officer may contact the person and confirm that the defendant has notified the person about the risk.

(13) The defendant shall follow the instructions of the probation officer related to the conditions of supervision.

(d) "Special" Conditions (Policy Statement)

The following "special" conditions of probation are recommended in the circumstances described and, in addition, may otherwise be appropriate in particular cases:

(A) If the defendant has one or more dependents — a condition specifying that the defendant shall support his or her dependents.

(B) If the defendant is ordered by the government to make child support payments or to make payments to support a person caring for a child — a condition specifying that the defendant shall make the payments and comply with the other terms of the order.

If an installment schedule of payment of restitution or a fine is imposed — a condition prohibiting the defendant from incurring new credit charges or opening additional lines of credit without approval of the probation officer unless the defendant is in compliance with the payment schedule.

(3) Access to Financial Information

If the court imposes an order of restitution, forfeiture, or notice to victims, or orders the defendant to pay a fine — a condition requiring the defendant to provide the probation officer access to any requested financial information.

If the court has reason to believe that the defendant is an abuser of narcotics, other controlled substances or alcohol — (A) a condition requiring the defendant to participate in a program approved by the United States Probation Office for substance abuse, which program may include testing to determine whether the defendant has reverted to the use of drugs or alcohol and (B) a condition specifying that the defendant shall not use or possess alcohol.

(5) Mental Health Program Participation

If the court has reason to believe that the defendant is in need of psychological or psychiatric treatment — a condition requiring that the defendant participate in a mental health program approved by the United States Probation Office.

If (A) the defendant and the United States entered into a stipulation of deportation pursuant to section 238(c)(5) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. § 1228(c)(5)*) or (B) in the absence of a stipulation of deportation, if, after notice and hearing pursuant to such section, the Attorney General demonstrates by clear and convincing evidence that the alien is deportable — a condition ordering deportation by a United States district court or a United States magistrate judge.

*So in original. Probably should be 8 U.S.C. § 1228(d)(5).

If the instant offense of conviction is a sex offense, as defined in Application Note 1 of the Commentary to §5D1.2 (Term of Supervised Release)—

(A) A condition requiring the defendant to participate in a program approved by the United States Probation Office for the treatment and monitoring of sex offenders.

(B) A condition limiting the use of a computer or an interactive computer service in cases in which the defendant used such items.

(C) A condition requiring the defendant to submit to a search, at any time, with or without a warrant, and by any law enforcement or probation officer, of the defendant's person and any property, house, residence, vehicle, papers, computer, other electronic communication or data storage devices or media, and effects, upon reasonable suspicion concerning a violation of a condition of probation or unlawful conduct by the defendant, or by any probation officer in the lawful discharge of the officer's supervision functions.

(e) Additional Conditions (Policy Statement)

The following "special conditions" may be appropriate on a case-by-case basis:

Residence in a community treatment center, halfway house or similar facility may be imposed as a condition of probation. See §5F1.1 (Community Confinement).

Home detention may be imposed as a condition of probation but only as a substitute for imprisonment. See §5F1.2 (Home Detention).

Community service may be imposed as a condition of probation. See §5F1.3 (Community Service).

(4) Occupational Restrictions

Occupational restrictions may be imposed as a condition of probation. See §5F1.5 (Occupational Restrictions).

A condition imposing a curfew may be imposed if the court concludes that restricting the defendant to his place of residence during evening and nighttime hours is necessary to provide just punishment for the offense, to protect the public from crimes that the defendant might commit during those hours, or to assist in the rehabilitation of the defendant. Electronic monitoring may be used as a means of surveillance to ensure compliance with a curfew order.

(6) Intermittent Confinement

Intermittent confinement (custody for intervals of time) may be ordered as a condition of probation during the first year of probation. See §5F1.8 (Intermittent Confinement).

1. Application of Subsection (c)(4).—Although the condition in subsection (c)(4) requires the defendant to "answer truthfully" the questions asked by the probation officer, a defendant's legitimate invocation of the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination in response to a probation officer's question shall not be considered a violation of this condition.

Historical Note: Effective November 1, 1987. Amended effective November 1, 1989 (amendments 273, 274, and 302) November 1, 1997 (amendment 569) November 1, 1998 (amendment 584) November 1, 2000 (amendment 605) November 1, 2001 (amendment 615) November 1, 2002 (amendment 644) November 1, 2004 (amendment 664) November 1, 2007 (amendments 701 and 711) November 1, 2009 (amendment 733) November 1, 2016 (amendment 803) November 1, 2018 (amendment 813).

§5B1.4. [Deleted]

Historical Note: Section 5B1.4 (Recommended Conditions of Probation and Supervised Release (Policy Statement)), effective November 1, 1987, amended effective November 1, 1989 (amendments 271, 272, and 302), was deleted by consolidation with §§5B1.3 and 5D1.3 effective November 1, 1997 (amendment 569).

PART C - IMPRISONMENT

§5C1.1. Imposition of a Term of Imprisonment

(a) A sentence conforms with the guidelines for imprisonment if it is within the minimum and maximum terms of the applicable guideline range.

(b) If the applicable guideline range is in Zone A of the Sentencing Table, a sentence of imprisonment is not required, unless the applicable guideline in Chapter Two expressly requires such a term.

(c) If the applicable guideline range is in Zone B of the Sentencing Table, the minimum term may be satisfied by --

(1) a sentence of imprisonment or

(2) a sentence of imprisonment that includes a term of supervised release with a condition that substitutes community confinement or home detention according to the schedule in subsection (e), provided that at least one month is satisfied by imprisonment or

(3) a sentence of probation that includes a condition or combination of conditions that substitute intermittent confinement, community confinement, or home detention for imprisonment according to the schedule in subsection (e).

(d) If the applicable guideline range is in Zone C of the Sentencing Table, the minimum term may be satisfied by --

(1) a sentence of imprisonment or

(2) a sentence of imprisonment that includes a term of supervised release with a condition that substitutes community confinement or home detention according to the schedule in subsection (e), provided that at least one-half of the minimum term is satisfied by imprisonment.

(e) Schedule of Substitute Punishments:

(1) One day of intermittent confinement in prison or jail for one day of imprisonment (each 24 hours of confinement is credited as one day of intermittent confinement, provided, however, that one day shall be credited for any calendar day during which the defendant is employed in the community and confined during all remaining hours)

(2) One day of community confinement (residence in a community treatment center, halfway house, or similar residential facility) for one day of imprisonment

(3) One day of home detention for one day of imprisonment.

(f) If the applicable guideline range is in Zone D of the Sentencing Table, the minimum term shall be satisfied by a sentence of imprisonment.

1. Subsection (a) provides that a sentence conforms with the guidelines for imprisonment if it is within the minimum and maximum terms of the applicable guideline range specified in the Sentencing Table in Part A of this Chapter. For example, if the defendant has an Offense Level of 20 and a Criminal History Category of I, the applicable guideline range is 33-41 months of imprisonment. Therefore, a sentence of imprisonment of at least thirty-three months, but not more than forty-one months, is within the applicable guideline range.

2. Subsection (b) provides that where the applicable guideline range is in Zone A of the Sentencing Table (i.e., the minimum term of imprisonment specified in the applicable guideline range is zero months), the court is not required to impose a sentence of imprisonment unless a sentence of imprisonment or its equivalent is specifically required by the guideline applicable to the offense. Where imprisonment is not required, the court, for example, may impose a sentence of probation. In some cases, a fine appropriately may be imposed as the sole sanction.

3. Subsection (c) provides that where the applicable guideline range is in Zone B of the Sentencing Table (i.e., the minimum term of imprisonment specified in the applicable guideline range is at least one but not more than nine months), the court has three options:

(A) It may impose a sentence of imprisonment.

(B) It may impose a sentence of probation provided that it includes a condition of probation requiring a period of intermittent confinement, community confinement, or home detention, or combination of intermittent confinement, community confinement, and home detention, sufficient to satisfy the minimum period of imprisonment specified in the guideline range. For example, where the guideline range is 4-10 months, a sentence of probation with a condition requiring at least four months of intermittent confinement, community confinement, or home detention would satisfy the minimum term of imprisonment specified in the guideline range.

(C) Or, it may impose a sentence of imprisonment that includes a term of supervised release with a condition that requires community confinement or home detention. In such case, at least one month must be satisfied by actual imprisonment and the remainder of the minimum term specified in the guideline range must be satisfied by community confinement or home detention. For example, where the guideline range is 4-10 months, a sentence of imprisonment of one month followed by a term of supervised release with a condition requiring three months of community confinement or home detention would satisfy the minimum term of imprisonment specified in the guideline range.

The preceding examples illustrate sentences that satisfy the minimum term of imprisonment required by the guideline range. The court, of course, may impose a sentence at a higher point within the applicable guideline range. For example, where the guideline range is 4-10 months, both a sentence of probation with a condition requiring six months of community confinement or home detention (under subsection (c)(3)) and a sentence of two months imprisonment followed by a term of supervised release with a condition requiring four months of community confinement or home detention (under subsection (c)(2)) would be within the guideline range.

4. If the defendant is a nonviolent first offender and the applicable guideline range is in Zone A or B of the Sentencing Table, the court should consider imposing a sentence other than a sentence of imprisonment, in accordance with subsection (b) or (c)(3). See 28 U.S.C. § 994(j). For purposes of this application note, a “nonviolent first offender” is a defendant who has no prior convictions or other comparable judicial dispositions of any kind and who did not use violence or credible threats of violence or possess a firearm or other dangerous weapon in connection with the offense of conviction. The phrase “comparable judicial dispositions of any kind” includes diversionary or deferred dispositions resulting from a finding or admission of guilt or a plea of nolo contendere and juvenile adjudications.

5. Subsection (d) provides that where the applicable guideline range is in Zone C of the Sentencing Table (i.e., the minimum term specified in the applicable guideline range is ten or twelve months), the court has two options:

(A) It may impose a sentence of imprisonment.

(B) Or, it may impose a sentence of imprisonment that includes a term of supervised release with a condition requiring community confinement or home detention. In such case, at least one-half of the minimum term specified in the guideline range must be satisfied by imprisonment, and the remainder of the minimum term specified in the guideline range must be satisfied by community confinement or home detention. For example, where the guideline range is 10-16 months, a sentence of five months imprisonment followed by a term of supervised release with a condition requiring five months community confinement or home detention would satisfy the minimum term of imprisonment required by the guideline range.

The preceding example illustrates a sentence that satisfies the minimum term of imprisonment required by the guideline range. The court, of course, may impose a sentence at a higher point within the guideline range. For example, where the guideline range is 10-16 months, both a sentence of five months imprisonment followed by a term of supervised release with a condition requiring six months of community confinement or home detention (under subsection (d)), and a sentence of ten months imprisonment followed by a term of supervised release with a condition requiring four months of community confinement or home detention (also under subsection (d)) would be within the guideline range.

6. Subsection (e) sets forth a schedule of imprisonment substitutes.

7. There may be cases in which a departure from the sentencing options authorized for Zone C of the Sentencing Table (under which at least half the minimum term must be satisfied by imprisonment) to the sentencing options authorized for Zone B of the Sentencing Table (under which all or most of the minimum term may be satisfied by intermittent confinement, community confinement, or home detention instead of imprisonment) is appropriate to accomplish a specific treatment purpose. Such a departure should be considered only in cases where the court finds that (A) the defendant is an abuser of narcotics, other controlled substances, or alcohol, or suffers from a significant mental illness, and (B) the defendant's criminality is related to the treatment problem to be addressed.

In determining whether such a departure is appropriate, the court should consider, among other things, (1) the likelihood that completion of the treatment program will successfully address the treatment problem, thereby reducing the risk to the public from further crimes of the defendant, and (2) whether imposition of less imprisonment than required by Zone C will increase the risk to the public from further crimes of the defendant.

Examples: The following examples both assume the applicable guideline range is 12-18 months and the court departs in accordance with this application note. Under Zone C rules, the defendant must be sentenced to at least six months imprisonment. (1) The defendant is a nonviolent drug offender in Criminal History Category I and probation is not prohibited by statute. The court departs downward to impose a sentence of probation, with twelve months of intermittent confinement, community confinement, or home detention and participation in a substance abuse treatment program as conditions of probation. (2) The defendant is convicted of a Class A or B felony, so probation is prohibited by statute (see §5B1.1(b)). The court departs downward to impose a sentence of one month imprisonment, with eleven months in community confinement or home detention and participation in a substance abuse treatment program as conditions of supervised release.

8. The use of substitutes for imprisonment as provided in subsections (c) and (d) is not recommended for most defendants with a criminal history category of III or above.

9. In a case in which community confinement in a residential treatment program is imposed to accomplish a specific treatment purpose, the court should consider the effectiveness of the residential treatment program.

10. Subsection (f) provides that, where the applicable guideline range is in Zone D of the Sentencing Table (i.e., the minimum term of imprisonment specified in the applicable guideline range is 15 months or more), the minimum term must be satisfied by a sentence of imprisonment without the use of any of the imprisonment substitutes in subsection (e).

Historical Note: Effective November 1, 1987. Amended effective January 15, 1988 (amendment 51) November 1, 1989 (amendments 271, 275, and 302) November 1, 1992 (amendment 462) November 1, 2002 (amendment 646) November 1, 2009 (amendment 733) November 1, 2010 (amendment 738) November 1, 2018 (amendment 811).

§5C1.2. Limitation on Applicability of Statutory Minimum Sentences in Certain Cases

(a) Except as provided in subsection (b), in the case of an offense under 21 U.S.C. § 841, § 844, § 846, § 960, or § 963, the court shall impose a sentence in accordance with the applicable guidelines without regard to any statutory minimum sentence, if the court finds that the defendant meets the criteria in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(f)(1)-(5) set forth below:

(1) the defendant does not have more than 1 criminal history point, as determined under the sentencing guidelines before application of subsection (b) of §4A1.3 (Departures Based on Inadequacy of Criminal History Category)

(2) the defendant did not use violence or credible threats of violence or possess a firearm or other dangerous weapon (or induce another participant to do so) in connection with the offense

(3) the offense did not result in death or serious bodily injury to any person

(4) the defendant was not an organizer, leader, manager, or supervisor of others in the offense, as determined under the sentencing guidelines and was not engaged in a continuing criminal enterprise, as defined in 21 U.S.C. § 848 and

(5) not later than the time of the sentencing hearing, the defendant has truthfully provided to the Government all information and evidence the defendant has concerning the offense or offenses that were part of the same course of conduct or of a common scheme or plan, but the fact that the defendant has no relevant or useful other information to provide or that the Government is already aware of the information shall not preclude a determination by the court that the defendant has complied with this requirement.

(b) In the case of a defendant (1) who meets the criteria set forth in subsection (a) and (2) for whom the statutorily required minimum sentence is at least five years, the offense level applicable from Chapters Two (Offense Conduct) and Three (Adjustments) shall be not less than level 17.

1. "More than 1 criminal history point, as determined under the sentencing guidelines," as used in subsection (a)(1), means more than one criminal history point as determined under §4A1.1 (Criminal History Category) before application of subsection (b) of §4A1.3 (Departures Based on Inadequacy of Criminal History Category).

2. "Dangerous weapon" and "firearm," as used in subsection (a)(2), and "serious bodily injury," as used in subsection (a)(3), are defined in the Commentary to §1B1.1 (Application Instructions).

3. "Offense," as used in subsection (a)(2)-(4), and "offense or offenses that were part of the same course of conduct or of a common scheme or plan," as used in subsection (a)(5), mean the offense of conviction and all relevant conduct.

4. Consistent with §1B1.3 (Relevant Conduct), the term "defendant," as used in subsection (a)(2), limits the accountability of the defendant to his own conduct and conduct that he aided or abetted, counseled, commanded, induced, procured, or willfully caused.

5. "Organizer, leader, manager, or supervisor of others in the offense, as determined under the sentencing guidelines," as used in subsection (a)(4), means a defendant who receives an adjustment for an aggravating role under §3B1.1 (Aggravating Role).

6. "Engaged in a continuing criminal enterprise," as used in subsection (a)(4), is defined in 21 U.S.C. § 848(c). As a practical matter, it should not be necessary to apply this prong of subsection (a)(4) because (i) this section does not apply to a conviction under 21 U.S.C. § 848, and (ii) any defendant who "engaged in a continuing criminal enterprise" but is convicted of an offense to which this section applies will be an "organizer, leader, manager, or supervisor of others in the offense."

7. Information disclosed by the defendant with respect to subsection (a)(5) may be considered in determining the applicable guideline range, except where the use of such information is restricted under the provisions of §1B1.8 (Use of Certain Information). That is, subsection (a)(5) does not provide an independent basis for restricting the use of information disclosed by the defendant.

8. Under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(f), prior to its determination, the court shall afford the government an opportunity to make a recommendation. See also Fed. R. Crim. P. 32(f), (i).

9. A defendant who meets the criteria under this section is exempt from any otherwise applicable statutory minimum sentence of imprisonment and statutory minimum term of supervised release.

Background: This section sets forth the relevant provisions of 18 U.S.C. § 3553(f), as added by section 80001(a) of the Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994, which limit the applicability of statutory minimum sentences in certain cases. Under the authority of section 80001(b) of that Act, the Commission has promulgated application notes to provide guidance in the application of 18 U.S.C. § 3553(f). See also H. Rep. No. 460, 103d Cong., 2d Sess. 3 (1994) (expressing intent to foster greater coordination between mandatory minimum sentencing and the sentencing guideline system).

Historical Note: Effective September 23, 1994 (amendment 509). Amended effective November 1, 1995 (amendment 515) November 1, 1996 (amendment 540) November 1, 1997 (amendment 570) November 1, 2001 (amendment 624) October 27, 2003 (amendment 651) November 1, 2004 (amendment 674) November 1, 2009 (amendment 736).

PART D - SUPERVISED RELEASE

§5D1.1. Imposition of a Term of Supervised Release

(a) The court shall order a term of supervised release to follow imprisonment—

(1) when required by statute (see 18 U.S.C. § 3583(a)) or

(2) except as provided in subsection (c), when a sentence of imprisonment of more than one year is imposed.

(b) The court may order a term of supervised release to follow imprisonment in any other case. See 18 U.S.C. § 3583(a).

(c) The court ordinarily should not impose a term of supervised release in a case in which supervised release is not required by statute and the defendant is a deportable alien who likely will be deported after imprisonment.

1. Application of Subsection (a).—Under subsection (a), the court is required to impose a term of supervised release to follow imprisonment when supervised release is required by statute or, except as provided in subsection (c), when a sentence of imprisonment of more than one year is imposed. The court may depart from this guideline and not impose a term of supervised release if supervised release is not required by statute and the court determines, after considering the factors set forth in Note 3, that supervised release is not necessary.

2. Application of Subsection (b).—Under subsection (b), the court may impose a term of supervised release to follow a term of imprisonment in any other case, after considering the factors set forth in Note 3.

3. Factors to Be Considered.—

(A) Statutory Factors.—In determining whether to impose a term of supervised release, the court is required by statute to consider, among other factors:

(i) the nature and circumstances of the offense and the history and characteristics of the defendant

(ii) the need to afford adequate deterrence to criminal conduct, to protect the public from further crimes of the defendant, and to provide the defendant with needed educational or vocational training, medical care, or other correctional treatment in the most effective manner

(iii) the need to avoid unwarranted sentence disparities among defendants with similar records who have been found guilty of similar conduct and

(iv) the need to provide restitution to any victims of the offense.

(B) Criminal History.—The court should give particular consideration to the defendant's criminal history (which is one aspect of the "history and characteristics of the defendant" in subparagraph (A)(i), above). In general, the more serious the defendant's criminal history, the greater the need for supervised release.

(C) Substance Abuse.—In a case in which a defendant sentenced to imprisonment is an abuser of controlled substances or alcohol, it is highly recommended that a term of supervised release also be imposed. See §5H1.4 (Physical Condition, Including Drug or Alcohol Dependence or Abuse Gambling Addiction).

(D) Domestic Violence.—If the defendant is convicted for the first time of a domestic violence crime as defined in 18 U.S.C. § 3561(b), a term of supervised release is required by statute. See 18 U.S.C. § 3583(a). Such a defendant is also required by statute to attend an approved rehabilitation program, if available within a 50-mile radius of the legal residence of the defendant. See 18 U.S.C. § 3583(d) §5D1.3(a)(3). In any other case involving domestic violence or stalking in which the defendant is sentenced to imprisonment, it is highly recommended that a term of supervised release also be imposed.

4. Community Confinement or Home Detention Following Imprisonment.—A term of supervised release must be imposed if the court wishes to impose a "split sentence" under which the defendant serves a term of imprisonment followed by a period of community confinement or home detention pursuant to subsection (c)(2) or (d)(2) of §5C1.1 (Imposition of a Term of Imprisonment). In such a case, the period of community confinement or home detention is imposed as a condition of supervised release.

5. Application of Subsection (c).—In a case in which the defendant is a deportable alien specified in subsection (c) and supervised release is not required by statute, the court ordinarily should not impose a term of supervised release. Unless such a defendant legally returns to the United States, supervised release is unnecessary. If such a defendant illegally returns to the United States, the need to afford adequate deterrence and protect the public ordinarily is adequately served by a new prosecution. The court should, however, consider imposing a term of supervised release on such a defendant if the court determines it would provide an added measure of deterrence and protection based on the facts and circumstances of a particular case.

Historical Note: Effective November 1, 1987. Amended effective November 1, 1989 (amendment 302) November 1, 1995 (amendment 529) November 1, 2010 (amendment 747) November 1, 2011 (amendment 756) November 1, 2014 (amendment 781).

§5D1.2. Term of Supervised Release

(a) Except as provided in subsections (b) and (c), if a term of supervised release is ordered, the length of the term shall be:

(1) At least two years but not more than five years for a defendant convicted of a Class A or B felony. See 18 U.S.C. § 3583(b)(1).

(2) At least one year but not more than three years for a defendant convicted of a Class C or D felony. See 18 U.S.C. § 3583(b)(2).

(3) One year for a defendant convicted of a Class E felony or a Class A misdemeanor. See 18 U.S.C. § 3583(b)(3).

(b) Notwithstanding subdivisions (a)(1) through (3), the length of the term of supervised release shall be not less than the minimum term of years specified for the offense under subdivisions (a)(1) through (3) and may be up to life, if the offense is—

(1) any offense listed in 18 U.S.C. § 2332b(g)(5)(B), the commission of which resulted in, or created a foreseeable risk of, death or serious bodily injury to another person or

(Policy Statement) If the instant offense of conviction is a sex offense, however, the statutory maximum term of supervised release is recommended.

(c) The term of supervised release imposed shall be not less than any statutorily required term of supervised release.

1. Definitions.—For purposes of this guideline:

"Sex offense" means (A) an offense, perpetrated against a minor, under (i) chapter 109A of title 18, United States Code (ii) chapter 110 of such title, not including a recordkeeping offense (iii) chapter 117 of such title, not including transmitting information about a minor or filing a factual statement about an alien individual (iv) an offense under 18 U.S.C. § 1201 or (v) an offense under 18 U.S.C. § 1591 or (B) an attempt or a conspiracy to commit any offense described in subdivisions (A)(i) through (v) of this note. Such term does not include an offense under 18 U.S.C. § 2250 (Failure to register).

"Minor" means (A) an individual who had not attained the age of 18 years (B) an individual, whether fictitious or not, who a law enforcement officer represented to a participant (i) had not attained the age of 18 years and (ii) could be provided for the purposes of engaging in sexually explicit conduct or (C) an undercover law enforcement officer who represented to a participant that the officer had not attained the age of 18 years.

2. Safety Valve Cases.—A defendant who qualifies under §5C1.2 (Limitation on Applicability of Statutory Minimum Sentence in Certain Cases) is not subject to any statutory minimum sentence of supervised release. See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(f). In such a case, the term of supervised release shall be determined under subsection (a).

3. Substantial Assistance Cases.—Upon motion of the Government, a defendant who has provided substantial assistance in the investigation or prosecution of another person who has committed an offense may be sentenced to a term of supervised release that is less than any minimum required by statute or the guidelines. See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(e), §5K1.1 (Substantial Assistance to Authorities).

4. Factors Considered.—The factors to be considered in determining the length of a term of supervised release are the same as the factors considered in determining whether to impose such a term. See 18 U.S.C. § 3583(c) Application Note 3 to §5D1.1 (Imposition of a Term of Supervised Release). The court should ensure that the term imposed on the defendant is long enough to address the purposes of imposing supervised release on the defendant.

5. Early Termination and Extension.—The court has authority to terminate or extend a term of supervised release. See 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e)(1), (2). The court is encouraged to exercise this authority in appropriate cases. The prospect of exercising this authority is a factor the court may wish to consider in determining the length of a term of supervised release. For example, the court may wish to consider early termination of supervised release if the defendant is an abuser of narcotics, other controlled substances, or alcohol who, while on supervised release, successfully completes a treatment program, thereby reducing the risk to the public from further crimes of the defendant.

6. Application of Subsection (c).—Subsection (c) specifies how a statutorily required minimum term of supervised release may affect the minimum term of supervised release provided by the guidelines.

For example, if subsection (a) provides a range of two years to five years, but the relevant statute requires a minimum term of supervised release of three years and a maximum term of life, the term of supervised release provided by the guidelines is restricted by subsection (c) to three years to five years. Similarly, if subsection (a) provides a range of two years to five years, but the relevant statute requires a minimum term of supervised release of five years and a maximum term of life, the term of supervised release provided by the guidelines is five years.

The following example illustrates the interaction of subsections (a) and (c) when subsection (b) is also involved. In this example, subsection (a) provides a range of two years to five years the relevant statute requires a minimum term of supervised release of five years and a maximum term of life and the offense is a sex offense under subsection (b). The effect of subsection (b) is to raise the maximum term of supervised release from five years (as provided by subsection (a)) to life, yielding a range of two years to life. The term of supervised release provided by the guidelines is then restricted by subsection (c) to five years to life. In this example, a term of supervised release of more than five years would be a guideline sentence. In addition, subsection (b) contains a policy statement recommending that the maximum — a life term of supervised release — be imposed.

Background: This section specifies the length of a term of supervised release that is to be imposed. Subsection (c) applies to statutes, such as the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1986, that require imposition of a specific minimum term of supervised release.

Historical Note: Effective November 1, 1987. Amended effective January 15, 1988 (amendment 52) November 1, 1989 (amendment 302) November 1, 1995 (amendment 529) November 1, 1997 (amendment 570) November 1, 2001 (amendment 615) November 1, 2002 (amendments 637 and 646) November 1, 2004 (amendment 664) November 1, 2005 (amendment 679) November 1, 2007 (amendment 701) November 1, 2009 (amendment 736) November 1, 2011 (amendment 756) November 1, 2014 (amendment 786).

§5D1.3. Conditions of Supervised Release

(1) The defendant shall not commit another federal, state or local offense (see 18 U.S.C. § 3583(d)).

(2) The defendant shall not unlawfully possess a controlled substance (see 18 U.S.C. § 3583(d)).

(3) The defendant who is convicted for a domestic violence crime as defined in 18 U.S.C. § 3561(b) for the first time shall attend a public, private, or private non-profit offender rehabilitation program that has been approved by the court, in consultation with a State Coalition Against Domestic Violence or other appropriate experts, if an approved program is available within a 50-mile radius of the legal residence of the defendant (see 18 U.S.C. § 3583(d)).

(4) The defendant shall refrain from any unlawful use of a controlled substance and submit to one drug test within 15 days of release on supervised release and at least two periodic drug tests thereafter (as determined by the court) for use of a controlled substance, but the condition stated in this paragraph may be ameliorated or suspended by the court for any individual defendant if the defendant’s presentence report or other reliable information indicates a low risk of future substance abuse by the defendant (see 18 U.S.C. § 3583(d)).

(5) If a fine is imposed and has not been paid upon release to supervised release, the defendant shall adhere to an installment schedule to pay that fine (see 18 U.S.C. § 3624(e)).

(6) The defendant shall (A) make restitution in accordance with 18 U.S.C. §§ 3663 and 3663A, or any other statute authorizing a sentence of restitution and (B) pay the assessment imposed in accordance with 18 U.S.C. § 3013. If there is a court-established payment schedule for making restitution or paying the assessment (see 18 U.S.C. § 3572(d)), the defendant shall adhere to the schedule.

(7) If the defendant is required to register under the Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act, the defendant shall comply with the requirements of that Act (see 18 U.S.C. § 3583(d)).

(8) The defendant shall submit to the collection of a DNA sample from the defendant at the direction of the United States Probation Office if the collection of such a sample is authorized pursuant to section 3 of the DNA Analysis Backlog Elimination Act of 2000 (34 U.S.C. § 40702).

(b) Discretionary Conditions

The court may impose other conditions of supervised release to the extent that such conditions (1) are reasonably related to (A) the nature and circumstances of the offense and the history and characteristics of the defendant (B) the need for the sentence imposed to afford adequate deterrence to criminal conduct (C) the need to protect the public from further crimes of the defendant and (D) the need to provide the defendant with needed educational or vocational training, medical care, or other correctional treatment in the most effective manner and (2) involve no greater deprivation of liberty than is reasonably necessary for the purposes set forth above and are consistent with any pertinent policy statements issued by the Sentencing Commission.

(c) "Standard" Conditions (Policy Statement)

The following "standard" conditions are recommended for supervised release. Several of the conditions are expansions of the conditions required by statute:

(1) The defendant shall report to the probation office in the federal judicial district where he or she is authorized to reside within 72 hours of release from imprisonment, unless the probation officer instructs the defendant to report to a different probation office or within a different time frame.

(2) After initially reporting to the probation office, the defendant will receive instructions from the court or the probation officer about how and when to report to the probation officer, and the defendant shall report to the probation officer as instructed.

(3) The defendant shall not knowingly leave the federal judicial district where he or she is authorized to reside without first getting permission from the court or the probation officer.

(4) The defendant shall answer truthfully the questions asked by the probation officer.

(5) The defendant shall live at a place approved by the probation officer. If the defendant plans to change where he or she lives or anything about his or her living arrangements (such as the people the defendant lives with), the defendant shall notify the probation officer at least 10 days before the change. If notifying the probation officer at least 10 days in advance is not possible due to unanticipated circumstances, the defendant shall notify the probation officer within 72 hours of becoming aware of a change or expected change.

(6) The defendant shall allow the probation officer to visit the defendant at any time at his or her home or elsewhere, and the defendant shall permit the probation officer to take any items prohibited by the conditions of the defendant's supervision that he or she observes in plain view.

(7) The defendant shall work full time (at least 30 hours per week) at a lawful type of employment, unless the probation officer excuses the defendant from doing so. If the defendant does not have full-time employment he or she shall try to find full-time employment, unless the probation officer excuses the defendant from doing so. If the defendant plans to change where the defendant works or anything about his or her work (such as the position or the job responsibilities), the defendant shall notify the probation officer at least 10 days before the change. If notifying the probation officer in advance is not possible due to unanticipated circumstances, the defendant shall notify the probation officer within 72 hours of becoming aware of a change or expected change.

(8) The defendant shall not communicate or interact with someone the defendant knows is engaged in criminal activity. If the defendant knows someone has been convicted of a felony, the defendant shall not knowingly communicate or interact with that person without first getting the permission of the probation officer.

(9) If the defendant is arrested or questioned by a law enforcement officer, the defendant shall notify the probation officer within 72 hours.

(10) The defendant shall not own, possess, or have access to a firearm, ammunition, destructive device, or dangerous weapon (i.e., anything that was designed, or was modified for, the specific purpose of causing bodily injury or death to another person, such as nunchakus or tasers).

(11) The defendant shall not act or make any agreement with a law enforcement agency to act as a confidential human source or informant without first getting the permission of the court.

(12) If the probation officer determines that the defendant poses a risk to another person (including an organization), the probation officer may require the defendant to notify the person about the risk and the defendant shall comply with that instruction. The probation officer may contact the person and confirm that the defendant has notified the person about the risk.

(13) The defendant shall follow the instructions of the probation officer related to the conditions of supervision.

(d) "Special" Conditions (Policy Statement)

The following "special" conditions of supervised release are recommended in the circumstances described and, in addition, may otherwise be appropriate in particular cases:

(A) If the defendant has one or more dependents — a condition specifying that the defendant shall support his or her dependents.

(B) If the defendant is ordered by the government to make child support payments or to make payments to support a person caring for a child — a condition specifying that the defendant shall make the payments and comply with the other terms of the order.

If an installment schedule of payment of restitution or a fine is imposed — a condition prohibiting the defendant from incurring new credit charges or opening additional lines of credit without approval of the probation officer unless the defendant is in compliance with the payment schedule.

(3) Access to Financial Information

If the court imposes an order of restitution, forfeiture, or notice to victims, or orders the defendant to pay a fine — a condition requiring the defendant to provide the probation officer access to any requested financial information.

If the court has reason to believe that the defendant is an abuser of narcotics, other controlled substances or alcohol — (A) a condition requiring the defendant to participate in a program approved by the United States Probation Office for substance abuse, which program may include testing to determine whether the defendant has reverted to the use of drugs or alcohol and (B) a condition specifying that the defendant shall not use or possess alcohol.

(5) Mental Health Program Participation

If the court has reason to believe that the defendant is in need of psychological or psychiatric treatment — a condition requiring that the defendant participate in a mental health program approved by the United States Probation Office.

If (A) the defendant and the United States entered into a stipulation of deportation pursuant to section 238(c)(5) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. § 1228(c)(5)*) or (B) in the absence of a stipulation of deportation, if, after notice and hearing pursuant to such section, the Attorney General demonstrates by clear and convincing evidence that the alien is deportable — a condition ordering deportation by a United States district court or a United States magistrate judge.

*So in original. Probably should be 8 U.S.C. § 1228(d)(5).

If the instant offense of conviction is a sex offense, as defined in Application Note 1 of the Commentary to §5D1.2 (Term of Supervised Release) —

(A) A condition requiring the defendant to participate in a program approved by the United States Probation Office for the treatment and monitoring of sex offenders.

(B) A condition limiting the use of a computer or an interactive computer service in cases in which the defendant used such items.

(C) A condition requiring the defendant to submit to a search, at any time, with or without a warrant, and by any law enforcement or probation officer, of the defendant's person and any property, house, residence, vehicle, papers, computer, other electronic communication or data storage devices or media, and effects upon reasonable suspicion concerning a violation of a condition of supervised release or unlawful conduct by the defendant, or by any probation officer in the lawful discharge of the officer's supervision functions.

(8) Unpaid Restitution, Fines, or Special Assessments

If the defendant has any unpaid amount of restitution, fines, or special assessments, the defendant shall notify the probation officer of any material change in the defendant's economic circumstances that might affect the defendant's ability to pay.

(e) Additional Conditions (Policy Statement)

The following "special conditions" may be appropriate on a case-by-case basis:

Residence in a community treatment center, halfway house or similar facility may be imposed as a condition of supervised release. See §5F1.1 (Community Confinement).

Home detention may be imposed as a condition of supervised release, but only as a substitute for imprisonment. See §5F1.2 (Home Detention).

Community service may be imposed as a condition of supervised release. See §5F1.3 (Community Service).

(4) Occupational Restrictions

Occupational restrictions may be imposed as a condition of supervised release. See §5F1.5 (Occupational Restrictions).

A condition imposing a curfew may be imposed if the court concludes that restricting the defendant to his place of residence during evening and nighttime hours is necessary to protect the public from crimes that the defendant might commit during those hours, or to assist in the rehabilitation of the defendant. Electronic monitoring may be used as a means of surveillance to ensure compliance with a curfew order.

(6) Intermittent Confinement

Intermittent confinement (custody for intervals of time) may be ordered as a condition of supervised release during the first year of supervised release, but only for a violation of a condition of supervised release in accordance with 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e)(2) and only when facilities are available. See §5F1.8 (Intermittent Confinement).

1. Application of Subsection (c)(4).—Although the condition in subsection (c)(4) requires the defendant to "answer truthfully" the questions asked by the probation officer, a defendant's legitimate invocation of the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination in response to a probation officer's question shall not be considered a violation of this condition.

Historical Note: Effective November 1, 1987. Amended effective November 1, 1989 (amendments 276, 277, and 302) November 1, 1997 (amendment 569) November 1, 1998 (amendment 584) November 1, 2000 (amendment 605) November 1, 2001 (amendment 615) November 1, 2002 (amendments 644 and 646) November 1, 2004 (amendment 664) November 1, 2007 (amendments 701 and 711) November 1, 2009 (amendment 733) November 1, 2016 (amendment 803) November 1, 2018 (amendments 812 and 813).

PART E - RESTITUTION, FINES, ASSESSMENTS, FORFEITURES

§5E1.1. Restitution

(a) In the case of an identifiable victim, the court shall --

(1) enter a restitution order for the full amount of the victim's loss, if such order is authorized under 18 U.S.C. § 1593, § 2248, § 2259, § 2264, § 2327, § 3663, or § 3663A, or 21 U.S.C. § 853(q) or

(2) impose a term of probation or supervised release with a condition requiring restitution for the full amount of the victim's loss, if the offense is not an offense for which restitution is authorized under 18 U.S.C. § 3663(a)(1) but otherwise meets the criteria for an order of restitution under that section.

(b) Provided, that the provisions of subsection (a) do not apply --

(1) when full restitution has been made or

(2) in the case of a restitution order under 18 U.S.C. § 3663 a restitution order under 18 U.S.C. § 3663A that pertains to an offense against property described in 18 U.S.C. § 3663A(c)(1)(A)(ii) or a condition of restitution imposed pursuant to subsection (a)(2) above, to the extent the court finds, from facts on the record, that (A) the number of identifiable victims is so large as to make restitution impracticable or (B) determining complex issues of fact related to the cause or amount of the victim's losses would complicate or prolong the sentencing process to a degree that the need to provide restitution to any victim is outweighed by the burden on the sentencing process.

(c) If a defendant is ordered to make restitution to an identifiable victim and to pay a fine, the court shall order that any money paid by the defendant shall first be applied to satisfy the order of restitution.

(d) In a case where there is no identifiable victim and the defendant was convicted under 21 U.S.C. § 841, § 848(a), § 849, § 856, § 861, or § 863, the court, taking into consideration the amount of public harm caused by the offense and other relevant factors, shall order an amount of community restitution not to exceed the fine imposed under §5E1.2.

(e) A restitution order may direct the defendant to make a single, lump sum payment, partial payments at specified intervals, in-kind payments, or a combination of payments at specified intervals and in-kind payments. See 18 U.S.C. § 3664(f)(3)(A). An in-kind payment may be in the form of (1) return of property (2) replacement of property or (3) if the victim agrees, services rendered to the victim or to a person or organization other than the victim. See 18 U.S.C. § 3664(f)(4).

(f) A restitution order may direct the defendant to make nominal periodic payments if the court finds from facts on the record that the economic circumstances of the defendant do not allow the payment of any amount of a restitution order and do not allow for the payment of the full amount of a restitution order in the foreseeable future under any reasonable schedule of payments.

(1) This guideline applies only to a defendant convicted of an offense committed on or after November 1, 1997. Notwithstanding the provisions of §1B1.11 (Use of Guidelines Manual in Effect on Date of Sentencing), use the former §5E1.1 (set forth in Appendix C, amendment 571) in lieu of this guideline in any other case.

1. The court shall not order community restitution under subsection (d) if it appears likely that such an award would interfere with a forfeiture under Chapter 46 or 96 of Title 18, United States Code, or under the Controlled Substances Act (21 U.S.C. § 801 et seq.). See 18 U.S.C. § 3663(c)(4).

Furthermore, a penalty assessment under 18 U.S.C. § 3013 or a fine under Subchapter C of Chapter 227 of Title 18, United States Code, shall take precedence over an order of community restitution under subsection (d). See 18 U.S.C. § 3663(c)(5).

Background: Section 3553(a)(7) of Title 18, United States Code, requires the court, "in determining the particular sentence to be imposed," to consider "the need to provide restitution to any victims of the offense." Orders of restitution are authorized under 18 U.S.C. §§ 1593, 2248, 2259, 2264, 2327, 3663, and 3663A, and 21 U.S.C. § 853(q). For offenses for which an order of restitution is not authorized, restitution may be imposed as a condition of probation or supervised release.

Subsection (d) implements the instruction to the Commission in section 205 of the Anti­terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996. This provision directs the Commission to develop guidelines for community restitution in connection with certain drug offenses where there is no identifiable victim but the offense causes "public harm."

To the extent that any of the above-noted statutory provisions conflict with the provisions of this guideline, the applicable statutory provision shall control.

Historical Note: Effective November 1, 1987. Amended effective January 15, 1988 (amendment 53) November 1, 1989 (amendments 278, 279, and 302) November 1, 1991 (amendment 383) November 1, 1993 (amendment 501) November 1, 1995 (amendment 530) November 1, 1997 (amendment 571) May 1, 2001 (amendment 612) November 1, 2001 (amendment 627).

§5E1.2. Fines for Individual Defendants

(a) The court shall impose a fine in all cases, except where the defendant establishes that he is unable to pay and is not likely to become able to pay any fine.

(b) The applicable fine guideline range is that specified in subsection (c) below. If, however, the guideline for the offense in Chapter Two provides a specific rule for imposing a fine, that rule takes precedence over subsection (c) of this section.

(c) (1) The minimum of the fine guideline range is the amount shown in column A of the table below.

(2) Except as specified in (4) below, the maximum of the fine guideline range is the amount shown in column B of the table below.

Offense
Level
A
Minimum
B
Maximum
3 and below $200 $9,500
4-5 $500 $9,500
6-7 $1,000 $9,500
8-9 $2,000 $20,000
10-11 $4,000 $40,000
12-13 $5,500 $55,000
14-15 $7,500 $75,000
16-17 $10,000 $95,000
18-19 $10,000 $100,000
20-22 $15,000 $150,000
23-25 $20,000 $200,000
26-28 $25,000 $250,000
29-31 $30,000 $300,000
32-34 $35,000 $350,000
35-37 $40,000 $400,000
38 and above $50,000 $500,000.

(4) Subsection (c)(2), limiting the maximum fine, does not apply if the defendant is convicted under a statute authorizing (A) a maximum fine greater than $500,000, or (B) a fine for each day of violation. In such cases, the court may impose a fine up to the maximum authorized by the statute.

(d) In determining the amount of the fine, the court shall consider:

(1) the need for the combined sentence to reflect the seriousness of the offense (including the harm or loss to the victim and the gain to the defendant), to promote respect for the law, to provide just punishment and to afford adequate deterrence

(2) any evidence presented as to the defendant's ability to pay the fine (including the ability to pay over a period of time) in light of his earning capacity and financial resources

(3) the burden that the fine places on the defendant and his dependents relative to alternative punishments

(4) any restitution or reparation that the defendant has made or is obligated to make

(5) any collateral consequences of conviction, including civil obligations arising from the defendant's conduct

(6) whether the defendant previously has been fined for a similar offense

(7) the expected costs to the government of any term of probation, or term of imprisonment and term of supervised release imposed and

(8) any other pertinent equitable considerations.

The amount of the fine should always be sufficient to ensure that the fine, taken together with other sanctions imposed, is punitive.

(e) If the defendant establishes that (1) he is not able and, even with the use of a reasonable installment schedule, is not likely to become able to pay all or part of the fine required by the preceding provisions, or (2) imposition of a fine would unduly burden the defendant's dependents, the court may impose a lesser fine or waive the fine. In these circumstances, the court shall consider alternative sanctions in lieu of all or a portion of the fine, and must still impose a total combined sanction that is punitive. Although any additional sanction not proscribed by the guidelines is permissible, community service is the generally preferable alternative in such instances.

(f) If the defendant establishes that payment of the fine in a lump sum would have an unduly severe impact on him or his dependents, the court should establish an installment schedule for payment of the fine. The length of the installment schedule generally should not exceed twelve months, and shall not exceed the maximum term of probation authorized for the offense. The defendant should be required to pay a substantial installment at the time of sentencing. If the court authorizes a defendant sentenced to probation or supervised release to pay a fine on an installment schedule, the court shall require as a condition of probation or supervised release that the defendant pay the fine according to the schedule. The court also may impose a condition prohibiting the defendant from incurring new credit charges or opening additional lines of credit unless he is in compliance with the payment schedule.

(g) If the defendant knowingly fails to pay a delinquent fine, the court shall resentence him in accordance with 18 U.S.C. § 3614.

(1) For offenses committed prior to November 1, 2015, use the applicable fine guideline range that was set forth in the version of §5E1.2(c) that was in effect on November 1, 2014, rather than the applicable fine guideline range set forth in subsection (c) above.

1. A fine may be the sole sanction if the guidelines do not require a term of imprisonment. If, however, the fine is not paid in full at the time of sentencing, it is recommended that the court sentence the defendant to a term of probation, with payment of the fine as a condition of probation. If a fine is imposed in addition to a term of imprisonment, it is recommended that the court impose a term of supervised release following imprisonment as a means of enforcing payment of the fine.

2. In general, the maximum fine permitted by law as to each count of conviction is $250,000 for a felony or for any misdemeanor resulting in death $100,000 for a Class A misdemeanor and $5,000 for any other offense. 18 U.S.C. § 3571(b)(3)-(7). However, higher or lower limits may apply when specified by statute. 18 U.S.C. § 3571(b)(1), (e). As an alternative maximum, the court may fine the defendant up to the greater of twice the gross gain or twice the gross loss. 18 U.S.C. § 3571(b)(2), (d).

3. The determination of the fine guideline range may be dispensed with entirely upon a court determination of present and future inability to pay any fine. The inability of a defendant to post bail bond (having otherwise been determined eligible for release) and the fact that a defendant is represented by (or was determined eligible for) assigned counsel are significant indicators of present inability to pay any fine. In conjunction with other factors, they may also indicate that the defendant is not likely to become able to pay any fine.

4. The Commission envisions that for most defendants, the maximum of the guideline fine range from subsection (c) will be at least twice the amount of gain or loss resulting from the offense. Where, however, two times either the amount of gain to the defendant or the amount of loss caused by the offense exceeds the maximum of the fine guideline, an upward departure from the fine guideline may be warranted.

Moreover, where a sentence within the applicable fine guideline range would not be sufficient to ensure both the disgorgement of any gain from the offense that otherwise would not be disgorged (e.g., by restitution or forfeiture) and an adequate punitive fine, an upward departure from the fine guideline range may be warranted.

5. Subsection (c)(4) applies to statutes that contain special provisions permitting larger fines the guidelines do not limit maximum fines in such cases. These statutes include, among others: 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(b) and 960(b), which authorize fines up to $8 million in offenses involving the manufacture, distribution, or importation of certain controlled substances 21 U.S.C. § 848(a), which authorizes fines up to $4 million in offenses involving the manufacture or distribution of controlled substances by a continuing criminal enterprise 18 U.S.C. § 1956(a), which authorizes a fine equal to the greater of $500,000 or two times the value of the monetary instruments or funds involved in offenses involving money laundering of financial instruments 18 U.S.C. § 1957(b)(2), which authorizes a fine equal to two times the amount of any criminally derived property involved in a money laundering transaction 33 U.S.C. § 1319(c), which authorizes a fine of up to $50,000 per day for violations of the Water Pollution Control Act 42 U.S.C. § 6928(d), which authorizes a fine of up to $50,000 per day for violations of the Resource Conservation Act and 52 U.S.C. § 30109(d)(1)(D), which authorizes, for violations of the Federal Election Campaign Act under 52 U.S.C. § 30122, a fine up to the greater of $50,000 or 1,000 percent of the amount of the violation, and which requires, in the case of such a violation, a minimum fine of not less than 300 percent of the amount of the violation.

There may be cases in which the defendant has entered into a conciliation agreement with the Federal Election Commission under section 309 of the Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971 in order to correct or prevent a violation of such Act by the defendant. The existence of a conciliation agreement between the defendant and Federal Election Commission, and the extent of compliance with that conciliation agreement, may be appropriate factors in determining at what point within the applicable fine guideline range to sentence the defendant, unless the defendant began negotiations toward a conciliation agreement after becoming aware of a criminal investigation.

6. The existence of income or assets that the defendant failed to disclose may justify a larger fine than that which otherwise would be warranted under this section. The court may base its conclusion as to this factor on information revealing significant unexplained expenditures by the defendant or unexplained possession of assets that do not comport with the defendant's reported income. If the court concludes that the defendant willfully misrepresented all or part of his income or assets, it may increase the offense level and resulting sentence in accordance with Chapter Three, Part C (Obstruction and Related Adjustments).

7. In considering subsection (d)(7), the court may be guided by reports published by the Bureau of Prisons and the Administrative Office of the United States Courts concerning average costs.

Historical Note: Effective November 1, 1987. Amended effective January 15, 1988 (amendment 54) November 1, 1989 (amendments 280, 281, and 302) November 1, 1990 (amendment 356) November 1, 1991 (amendment 384) November 1, 1997 (amendment 572) November 1, 2002 (amendment 646) January 25, 2003 (amendment 648) November 1, 2003 (amendment 656) November 1, 2011 (amendment 758) November 1, 2015 (amendments 791 and 796).

§5E1.3. Special Assessments

A special assessment must be imposed on a convicted defendant in the amount prescribed by statute.

1. This guideline applies only if the defendant is an individual. See §8E1.1 for special assessments applicable to organizations.

2. The following special assessments are provided by statute (18 U.S.C. § 3013):

For Offenses Committed By Individuals On Or After April 24, 1996:

(A) $100, if convicted of a felony
(B) $25, if convicted of a Class A misdemeanor
(C) $10, if convicted of a Class B misdemeanor
(D) $5, if convicted of a Class C misdemeanor or an infraction.

For Offenses Committed By Individuals On Or After November 18, 1988 But Prior To April 24, 1996:

(E) $50, if convicted of a felony
(F) $25, if convicted of a Class A misdemeanor
(G) $10, if convicted of a Class B misdemeanor
(H) $5, if convicted of a Class C misdemeanor or an infraction.

For Offenses Committed By Individuals Prior To November 18, 1988:

(I) $50, if convicted of a felony
(J) $25, if convicted of a misdemeanor.

3. A special assessment is required by statute for each count of conviction.

Background: Section 3013 of Title 18, United States Code, added by The Victims of Crimes Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-473, Title II, Chap. XIV, requires courts to impose special assessments on convicted defendants for the purpose of funding the Crime Victims Fund established by the same legislation.

Historical Note: Effective November 1, 1987. Amended effective November 1, 1989 (amendments 282 and 302) November 1, 1997 (amendment 573).

§5E1.4. Forfeiture

Forfeiture is to be imposed upon a convicted defendant as provided by statute.

Background: Forfeiture provisions exist in various statutes. For example, 18 U.S.C. § 3554 requires the court imposing a sentence under 18 U.S.C. § 1962 (proscribing the use of the proceeds of racketeering activities in the operation of an enterprise engaged in interstate commerce) or Titles II and III of the Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act of 1970 (proscribing the manufacture and distribution of controlled substances) to order the forfeiture of property in accordance with 18 U.S.C. § 1963 and 21 U.S.C. § 853, respectively. Those provisions require the automatic forfeiture of certain property upon conviction of their respective underlying offenses.

In addition, the provisions of 18 U.S.C. §§ 3681-3682 authorizes the court, in certain circumstances, to order the forfeiture of a violent criminal's proceeds from the depiction of his crime in a book, movie, or other medium. Those sections authorize the deposit of proceeds in an escrow account in the Crime Victims Fund of the United States Treasury. The money is to remain available in the account for five years to satisfy claims brought against the defendant by the victim(s) of his offenses. At the end of the five-year period, the court may require that any proceeds remaining in the account be released from escrow and paid into the Fund. 18 U.S.C. § 3681(c)(2).

Historical Note: Effective November 1, 1987. Amended effective November 1, 1989 (amendment 302).

§5E1.5. Costs of Prosecution (Policy Statement)

Costs of prosecution shall be imposed on a defendant as required by statute.

Background: Various statutes require the court to impose the costs of prosecution: 7 U.S.C. § 13 (larceny or embezzlement in connection with commodity exchanges) 21 U.S.C. § 844 (simple possession of controlled substances) (unless the court finds that the defendant lacks the ability to pay) 26 U.S.C. § 7201 (attempt to defeat or evade income tax) 26 U.S.C. § 7202 (willful failure to collect or pay tax) 26 U.S.C. § 7203 (willful failure to file income tax return, supply information, or pay tax) 26 U.S.C. § 7206 (fraud and false statements) 26 U.S.C. § 7210 (failure to obey summons) 26 U.S.C. § 7213 (unauthorized disclosure of information) 26 U.S.C. § 7215 (offenses with respect to collected taxes) 26 U.S.C. § 7216 (disclosure or use of information by preparers of returns) 26 U.S.C. § 7232 (failure to register or false statement by gasoline manufacturer or producer) 42 U.S.C. § 1320c-9 (improper FOIA disclosure) 43 U.S.C. § 942-6 (rights of way for Alaskan wagon roads).

Historical Note: Effective November 1, 1992 (amendment 463). Amended effective November 1, 2010 (amendment 747).

PART F - SENTENCING OPTIONS

§5F1.1. Community Confinement

Community confinement may be imposed as a condition of probation or supervised release.

1. "Community confinement" means residence in a community treatment center, halfway house, restitution center, mental health facility, alcohol or drug rehabilitation center, or other community facility and participation in gainful employment, employment search efforts, community service, vocational training, treatment, educational programs, or similar facility-approved programs during non-residential hours.

2. Community confinement generally should not be imposed for a period in excess of six months. A longer period may be imposed to accomplish the objectives of a specific rehabilitative program, such as drug rehabilitation. The sentencing judge may impose other discretionary conditions of probation or supervised release appropriate to effectuate community confinement.

Historical Note: Effective November 1, 1987. Amended effective November 1, 1989 (amendment 302) November 1, 2002 (amendment 646) November 1, 2009 (amendment 733).

§5F1.2. Home Detention

Home detention may be imposed as a condition of probation or supervised release, but only as a substitute for imprisonment.

1. "Home detention"means a program of confinement and supervision that restricts the defendant to his place of residence continuously, except for authorized absences, enforced by appropriate means of surveillance by the probation office. When an order of home detention is imposed, the defendant is required to be in his place of residence at all times except for approved absences for gainful employment, community service, religious services, medical care, educational or training programs, and such other times as may be specifically authorized. Electronic monitoring is an appropriate means of surveillance for home detention. However, alternative means of surveillance may be used if appropriate.

2. The court may impose other conditions of probation or supervised release appropriate to effectuate home detention. If the court concludes that the amenities available in the residence of a defendant would cause home detention not to be sufficiently punitive, the court may limit the amenities available.

3. The defendant's place of residence, for purposes of home detention, need not be the place where the defendant previously resided. It may be any place of residence, so long as the owner of the residence (and any other person(s) from whom consent is necessary) agrees to any conditions that may be imposed by the court, e.g., conditions that a monitoring system be installed, that there will be no "call forwarding" or "call waiting" services, or that there will be no cordless telephones or answering machines.

Background: The Commission has concluded that electronic monitoring is an appropriate means of surveillance for home detention. However, in some cases home detention may effectively be enforced without electronic monitoring, e.g., when the defendant is physically incapacitated, or where some other effective means of surveillance is available. Accordingly, the Commission has not required that electronic monitoring be a necessary condition for home detention. Nevertheless, before ordering home detention without electronic monitoring, the court should be confident that an alternative form of surveillance is appropriate considering the facts and circumstances of the defendant’s case.

In the usual case, the Commission assumes that a condition requiring that the defendant seek and maintain gainful employment will be imposed when home detention is ordered.

Historical Note: Effective November 1, 1987. Amended effective November 1, 1989 (amendments 271 and 302) November 1, 2018 (amendment 811).

§5F1.3. Community Service

Community service may be ordered as a condition of probation or supervised release.

1. Community service generally should not be imposed in excess of 400 hours. Longer terms of community service impose heavy administrative burdens relating to the selection of suitable placements and the monitoring of attendance.

Historical Note: Effective November 1, 1987. Amended effective November 1, 1989 (amendments 283 and 302) November 1, 1991 (amendment 419).

§5F1.4. Order of Notice to Victims

The court may order the defendant to pay the cost of giving notice to victims pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3555. This cost may be set off against any fine imposed if the court determines that the imposition of both sanctions would be excessive.

Background: In cases where a defendant has been convicted of an offense involving fraud or "other intentionally deceptive practices," the court may order the defendant to "give reasonable notice and explanation of the conviction, in such form as the court may approve" to the victims of the offense. 18 U.S.C. § 3555. The court may order the notice to be given by mail, by advertising in specific areas or through specific media, or by other appropriate means. In determining whether a notice is appropriate, the court must consider the generally applicable sentencing factors listed in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) and the cost involved in giving the notice as it relates to the loss caused by the crime. The court may not require the defendant to pay more than $20,000 to give notice.

If an order of notice to victims is under consideration, the court must notify the government and the defendant. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(d). Upon motion of either party, or on its own motion, the court must: (1) permit the parties to submit affidavits and memoranda relevant to the imposition of such an order (2) provide counsel for both parties the opportunity to address orally, in open court, the appropriateness of such an order and (3) if it issues such an order, state its reasons for doing so. The court may also order any additional procedures that will not unduly complicate or prolong the sentencing process.

Historical Note: Effective November 1, 1987. Amended effective November 1, 1989 (amendments 284 and 302).

§5F1.5. Occupational Restrictions

(a) The court may impose a condition of probation or supervised release prohibiting the defendant from engaging in a specified occupation, business, or profession, or limiting the terms on which the defendant may do so, only if it determines that:

(1) a reasonably direct relationship existed between the defendant's occupation, business, or profession and the conduct relevant to the offense of conviction and

(2) imposition of such a restriction is reasonably necessary to protect the public because there is reason to believe that, absent such restriction, the defendant will continue to engage in unlawful conduct similar to that for which the defendant was convicted.

(b) If the court decides to impose a condition of probation or supervised release restricting a defendant's engagement in a specified occupation, business, or profession, the court shall impose the condition for the minimum time and to the minimum extent necessary to protect the public.

Background: The Comprehensive Crime Control Act authorizes the imposition of occupational restrictions as a condition of probation, 18 U.S.C. § 3563(b)(5), or supervised release, 18 U.S.C. § 3583(d). Pursuant to § 3563(b)(5), a court may require a defendant to:

[R]efrain, in the case of an individual, from engaging in a specified occupation, business, or profession bearing a reasonably direct relationship to the conduct constituting the offense, or engage in such a specified occupation, business, or profession only to a stated degree or under stated circumstances.

Section 3583(d) incorporates this section by reference. The Senate Judiciary Committee Report on the Comprehensive Crime Control Act explains that the provision was "intended to be used to preclude the continuation or repetition of illegal activities while avoiding a bar from employment that exceeds that needed to achieve that result." S. Rep. No. 225, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 96-97. The condition "should only be used as reasonably necessary to protect the public. It should not be used as a means of punishing the convicted person." Id. at 96. Section 5F1.5 accordingly limits the use of the condition and, if imposed, limits its scope, to the minimum reasonably necessary to protect the public.

The appellate review provisions permit a defendant to challenge the imposition of a probation condition under 18 U.S.C. § 3563(b)(5) if the sentence includes a more limiting condition of probation or supervised release than the maximum established in the guideline. See 18 U.S.C. § 3742(a)(3). The government may appeal if the sentence includes a less limiting condition of probation than the minimum established in the guideline. See 18 U.S.C. § 3742(b)(3).

Historical Note: Effective November 1, 1987. Amended effective November 1, 1989 (amendments 285 and 302) November 1, 1991 (amendment 428) November 1, 2002 (amendment 646).

§5F1.6. Denial of Federal Benefits to Drug Traffickers and Possessors

The court, pursuant to 21 U.S.C. § 862, may deny the eligibility for certain Federal benefits of any individual convicted of distribution or possession of a controlled substance.

1. "Federal benefit" is defined in 21 U.S.C. § 862(d) to mean "any grant, contract, loan, professional license, or commercial license provided by an agency of the United States or by appropriated funds of the United States" but "does not include any retirement, welfare, Social Security, health, disability, veterans benefit, public housing, or other similar benefit, or any other benefit for which payments or services are required for eligibility."

Background: Subsections (a) and (b) of 21 U.S.C. § 862 provide that an individual convicted of a state or federal drug trafficking or possession offense may be denied certain federal benefits. Except for an individual convicted of a third or subsequent drug distribution offense, the period of benefit ineligibility, within the applicable maximum term set forth in 21 U.S.C. § 862(a)(1) (for distribution offenses) and (b)(1)(for possession offenses), is at the discretion of the court. In the case of an individual convicted of a third or subsequent drug distribution offense, denial of benefits is mandatory and permanent under 21 U.S.C. § 862(a)(1)(C) (unless suspended by the court under 21 U.S.C. § 862(c)).

Subsection (b)(2) of 21 U.S.C. § 862 provides that the period of benefit ineligibility that may be imposed in the case of a drug possession offense "shall be waived in the case of a person who, if there is a reasonable body of evidence to substantiate such declaration, declares himself to be an addict and submits himself to a long-term treatment program for addiction, or is deemed to be rehabilitated pursuant to rules established by the Secretary of Health and Human Services."

Subsection (c) of 21 U.S.C. § 862 provides that the period of benefit ineligibility shall be suspended "if the individual (A) completes a supervised drug rehabilitation program after becoming ineligible under this section (B) has otherwise been rehabilitated or (C) has made a good faith effort to gain admission to a supervised drug rehabilitation program, but is unable to do so because of inaccessibility or unavailability of such a program, or the inability of the individual to pay for such a program."

Subsection (e) of 21 U.S.C. § 862 provides that a period of benefit ineligibility "shall not apply to any individual who cooperates or testifies with the Government in the prosecution of a Federal or State offense or who is in a Government witness protection program."

Historical Note: Effective November 1, 1989 (amendment 305) November 1, 1992 (amendment 464).

§5F1.7. Shock Incarceration Program (Policy Statement)

The court, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. §§ 3582(a) and 3621(b)(4), may recommend that a defendant who meets the criteria set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 4046 participate in a shock incarceration program.

Background: Section 4046 of title 18, United States Code, provides --

"(a) the Bureau of Prisons may place in a shock incarceration program any person who is sentenced to a term of more than 12, but not more than 30 months, if such person consents to that placement.

(b) For such initial portion of the term of imprisonment as the Bureau of Prisons may determine, not to exceed six months, an inmate in the shock incarceration program shall be required to -

(1) adhere to a highly regimented schedule that provides the strict discipline, physical training, hard labor, drill, and ceremony characteristic of military basic training and

(2) participate in appropriate job training and educational programs (including literacy programs) and drug, alcohol, and other counseling programs.

(c) An inmate who in the judgment of the Director of the Bureau of Prisons has successfully completed the required period of shock incarceration shall remain in the custody of the Bureau for such period (not to exceed the remainder of the prison term otherwise required by law to be served by that inmate), and under such conditions, as the Bureau deems appropriate. 18 U.S.C. § 4046."

The Bureau of Prisons has issued an operations memorandum (174-90 (5390), November 20, 1990) that outlines eligibility criteria and procedures for the implementation of this program (which the Bureau of Prisons has titled "intensive confinement program"). Under these procedures, the Bureau will not place a defendant in an intensive confinement program unless the sentencing court has approved, either at the time of sentencing or upon consultation after the Bureau has determined that the defendant is otherwise eligible. In return for the successful completion of the "intensive confinement" portion of the program, the defendant is eligible to serve the remainder of his term of imprisonment in a graduated release program comprised of community corrections center and home confinement phases.

Historical Note: Effective November 1, 1991 (amendment 424). Amended effective November 1, 2002 (amendment 646).

§5F1.8. Intermittent Confinement

Intermittent confinement may be imposed as a condition of probation during the first year of probation. See 18 U.S.C. § 3563(b)(10). It may be imposed as a condition of supervised release during the first year of supervised release, but only for a violation of a condition of supervised release in accordance with 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e)(2) and only when facilities are available. See 18 U.S.C. § 3583(d).

1. "Intermittent confinement" means remaining in the custody of the Bureau of Prisons during nights, weekends, or other intervals of time, totaling no more than the lesser of one year or the term of imprisonment authorized for the offense, during the first year of the term of probation or supervised release. See 18 U.S.C. § 3563(b)(10).

Historical Note: Effective November 1, 2009 (amendment 733).

PART G - IMPLEMENTING THE TOTAL SENTENCE OF IMPRISONMENT

§5G1.1. Sentencing on a Single Count of Conviction

(a) Where the statutorily authorized maximum sentence is less than the minimum of the applicable guideline range, the statutorily authorized maximum sentence shall be the guideline sentence.

(b) Where a statutorily required minimum sentence is greater than the maximum of the applicable guideline range, the statutorily required minimum sentence shall be the guideline sentence.

(c) In any other case, the sentence may be imposed at any point within the applicable guideline range, provided that the sentence --

(1) is not greater than the statutorily authorized maximum sentence, and

(2) is not less than any statutorily required minimum sentence.

This section describes how the statutorily authorized maximum sentence, or a statutorily required minimum sentence, may affect the determination of a sentence under the guidelines. For example, if the applicable guideline range is 51-63 months and the maximum sentence authorized by statute for the offense of conviction is 48 months, the sentence required by the guidelines under subsection (a) is 48 months a sentence of less than 48 months would be a guideline departure. If the applicable guideline range is 41-51 months and there is a statutorily required minimum sentence of 60 months, the sentence required by the guidelines under subsection (b) is 60 months a sentence of more than 60 months would be a guideline departure. If the applicable guideline range is 51-63 months and the maximum sentence authorized by statute for the offense of conviction is 60 months, the guideline range is restricted to 51-60 months under subsection (c).

Historical Note: Effective November 1, 1987. Amended effective November 1, 1989 (amendment 286).

§5G1.2. Sentencing on Multiple Counts of Conviction

(a) Except as provided in subsection (e), the sentence to be imposed on a count for which the statute (1) specifies a term of imprisonment to be imposed and (2) requires that such term of imprisonment be imposed to run consecutively to any other term of imprisonment, shall be determined by that statute and imposed independently.

(b) For all counts not covered by subsection (a), the court shall determine the total punishment and shall impose that total punishment on each such count, except to the extent otherwise required by law.

(c) If the sentence imposed on the count carrying the highest statutory maximum is adequate to achieve the total punishment, then the sentences on all counts shall run concurrently, except to the extent otherwise required by law.

(d) If the sentence imposed on the count carrying the highest statutory maximum is less than the total punishment, then the sentence imposed on one or more of the other counts shall run consecutively, but only to the extent necessary to produce a combined sentence equal to the total punishment. In all other respects, sentences on all counts shall run concurrently, except to the extent otherwise required by law.

(e) In a case in which subsection (c) of §4B1.1 (Career Offender) applies, to the extent possible, the total punishment is to be apportioned among the counts of conviction, except that (1) the sentence to be imposed on a count requiring a minimum term of imprisonment shall be at least the minimum required by statute and (2) the sentence to be imposed on the 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) or § 929(a) count shall be imposed to run consecutively to any other count.

1. In General.—This section specifies the procedure for determining the specific sentence to be formally imposed on each count in a multiple-count case. The combined length of the sentences ("total punishment") is determined by the court after determining the adjusted combined offense level and the Criminal History Category and determining the defendant's guideline range on the Sentencing Table in Chapter Five, Part A (Sentencing Table).

Note that the defendant's guideline range on the Sentencing Table may be affected or restricted by a statutorily authorized maximum sentence or a statutorily required minimum sentence not only in a single-count case, see §5G1.1 (Sentencing on a Single Count of Conviction), but also in a multiple-count case. See Note 3, below.

Except as otherwise required by subsection (e) or any other law, the total punishment is to be imposed on each count and the sentences on all counts are to be imposed to run concurrently to the extent allowed by the statutory maximum sentence of imprisonment for each count of conviction.

This section applies to multiple counts of conviction (A) contained in the same indictment or information, or (B) contained in different indictments or informations for which sentences are to be imposed at the same time or in a consolidated proceeding.

Usually, at least one of the counts will have a statutory maximum adequate to permit imposition of the total punishment as the sentence on that count. The sentence on each of the other counts will then be set at the lesser of the total punishment and the applicable statutory maximum, and be made to run concurrently with all or part of the longest sentence. If no count carries an adequate statutory maximum, consecutive sentences are to be imposed to the extent necessary to achieve the total punishment.

2. Mandatory Minimum and Mandatory Consecutive Terms of Imprisonment (Not Covered by Subsection (e)).—

(A) In General.—Subsection (a) applies if a statute (i) specifies a term of imprisonment to be imposed and (ii) requires that such term of imprisonment be imposed to run consecutively to any other term of imprisonment. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (requiring mandatory minimum terms of imprisonment, based on the conduct involved, and also requiring the sentence imposed to run consecutively to any other term of imprisonment) and 18 U.S.C. § 1028A (requiring a mandatory term of imprisonment of either two or five years, based on the conduct involved, and also requiring, except in the circumstances described in subdivision (B), the sentence imposed to run consecutively to any other term of imprisonment). Except for certain career offender situations in which subsection (c) of §4B1.1 (Career Offender) applies, the term of years to be imposed consecutively is the minimum required by the statute of conviction and is independent of the guideline sentence on any other count. See, e.g., the Commentary to §§2K2.4 (Use of Firearm, Armor-Piercing Ammunition, or Explosive During or in Relation to Certain Crimes) and 3D1.1 (Procedure for Determining Offense Level on Multiple Counts) regarding the determination of the offense levels for related counts when a conviction under 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) is involved. Subsection (a) also applies in certain other instances in which an independently determined and consecutive sentence is required. See, e.g., Application Note 3 of the Commentary to §2J1.6 (Failure to Appear by Defendant), relating to failure to appear for service of sentence.

(B) Multiple Convictions Under 18 U.S.C. § 1028A.—Section 1028A of title 18, United States Code, generally requires that the mandatory term of imprisonment for a violation of such section be imposed consecutively to any other term of imprisonment. However, 18 U.S.C. § 1028A(b)(4) permits the court, in its discretion, to impose the mandatory term of imprisonment on a defendant for a violation of such section "concurrently, in whole or in part, only with another term of imprisonment that is imposed by the court at the same time on that person for an additional violation of this section, provided that such discretion shall be exercised in accordance with any applicable guidelines and policy statements issued by the Sentencing Commission. . .".

In determining whether multiple counts of 18 U.S.C. § 1028A should run concurrently with, or consecutively to, each other, the court should consider the following non-exhaustive list of factors:

(i) The nature and seriousness of the underlying offenses. For example, the court should consider the appropriateness of imposing consecutive, or partially consecutive, terms of imprisonment for multiple counts of 18 U.S.C. § 1028A in a case in which an underlying offense for one of the 18 U.S.C. § 1028A offenses is a crime of violence or an offense enumerated in 18 U.S.C. § 2332b(g)(5)(B).

(ii) Whether the underlying offenses are groupable under §3D1.2 (Groups of Closely Related Counts). Generally, multiple counts of 18 U.S.C. § 1028A should run concurrently with one another in cases in which the underlying offenses are groupable under §3D1.2.

(iii) Whether the purposes of sentencing set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2) are better achieved by imposing a concurrent or a consecutive sentence for multiple counts of 18 U.S.C. § 1028A.

(C) Imposition of Supervised Release.—In the case of a consecutive term of imprisonment imposed under subsection (a), any term of supervised release imposed is to run concurrently with any other term of supervised release imposed. See 18 U.S.C. § 3624(e).

3. Application of Subsection (b).—

(A) In General.—Subsection (b) provides that, for all counts not covered by subsection (a), the court shall determine the total punishment (i.e., the combined length of the sentences to be imposed) and shall impose that total punishment on each such count, except to the extent otherwise required by law (such as where a statutorily required minimum sentence or a statutorily authorized maximum sentence otherwise requires).

(B) Effect on Guidelines Range of Mandatory Minimum or Statutory Maximum.—The defendant's guideline range on the Sentencing Table may be affected or restricted by a statutorily authorized maximum sentence or a statutorily required minimum sentence not only in a single-count case, see §5G1.1, but also in a multiple-count case.

In particular, where a statutorily required minimum sentence on any count is greater than the maximum of the applicable guideline range, the statutorily required minimum sentence on that count shall be the guideline sentence on all counts. See §5G1.1(b). Similarly, where a statutorily required minimum sentence on any count is greater than the minimum of the applicable guideline range, the guideline range for all counts is restricted by that statutorily required minimum sentence. See §5G1.1(c)(2) and accompanying Commentary.

However, where a statutorily authorized maximum sentence on a particular count is less than the minimum of the applicable guideline range, the sentence imposed on that count shall not be greater than the statutorily authorized maximum sentence on that count. See §5G1.1(a).

(C) Examples.—The following examples illustrate how subsection (b) applies, and how the restrictions in subparagraph (B) operate, when a statutorily required minimum sentence is involved.

Defendant A and Defendant B are each convicted of the same four counts. Counts 1, 3, and 4 have statutory maximums of 10 years, 20 years, and 2 years, respectively. Count 2 has a statutory maximum of 30 years and a mandatory minimum of 10 years.

For Defendant A, the court determines that the final offense level is 19 and the defendant is in Criminal History Category I, which yields a guideline range on the Sentencing Table of 30 to 37 months. Because of the 10-year mandatory minimum on Count 2, however, Defendant A's guideline sentence is 120 months. See subparagraph (B), above. After considering that guideline sentence, the court determines that the appropriate "total punishment" to be imposed on Defendant A is 120 months. Therefore, subsection (b) requires that the total punishment of 120 months be imposed on each of Counts 1, 2, and 3. The sentence imposed on Count 4 is limited to 24 months, because a statutory maximum of 2 years applies to that particular count.

For Defendant B, in contrast, the court determines that the final offense level is 30 and the defendant is in Criminal History Category II, which yields a guideline range on the Sentencing Table of 108 to 135 months. Because of the 10-year mandatory minimum on Count 2, however, Defendant B's guideline range is restricted to 120 to 135 months. See subparagraph (B), above. After considering that restricted guideline range, the court determines that the appropriate "total punishment" to be imposed on Defendant B is 130 months. Therefore, subsection (b) requires that the total punishment of 130 months be imposed on each of Counts 2 and 3. The sentences imposed on Counts 1 and 4 are limited to 120 months (10 years) and 24 months (2 years), respectively, because of the applicable statutory maximums.

(D) Special Rule on Resentencing.—In a case in which (i) the defendant's guideline range on the Sentencing Table was affected or restricted by a statutorily required minimum sentence (as described in subparagraph (B)), (ii) the court is resentencing the defendant, and (iii) the statutorily required minimum sentence no longer applies, the defendant's guideline range for purposes of the remaining counts shall be redetermined without regard to the previous effect or restriction of the statutorily required minimum sentence.

4. Career Offenders Covered under Subsection (e).—

(A) Imposing Sentence.—The sentence imposed for a conviction under 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) or § 929(a) shall, under that statute, consist of a minimum term of imprisonment imposed to run consecutively to the sentence on any other count. Subsection (e) requires that the total punishment determined under §4B1.1(c) be apportioned among all the counts of conviction. In most cases this can be achieved by imposing the statutory minimum term of imprisonment on the 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) or § 929(a) count, subtracting that minimum term of imprisonment from the total punishment determined under §4B1.1(c), and then imposing the balance of the total punishment on the other counts of conviction. In some cases covered by subsection (e), a consecutive term of imprisonment longer than the minimum required by 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) or § 929(a) will be necessary in order both to achieve the total punishment determined by the court and to comply with the applicable statutory requirements.

(B) Examples.—The following examples illustrate the application of subsection (e) in a multiple count situation:

(i) The defendant is convicted of one count of violating 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) for possessing a firearm in furtherance of a drug trafficking offense (5 year mandatory minimum), and one count of violating 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(C) (20 year statutory maximum). Applying §4B1.1(c), the court determines that a sentence of 300 months is appropriate (applicable guideline range of 262-327). The court then imposes a sentence of 60 months on the 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) count, subtracts that 60 months from the total punishment of 300 months and imposes the remainder of 240 months on the 21 U.S.C. § 841 count. As required by statute, the sentence on the 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) count is imposed to run consecutively.

(ii) The defendant is convicted of one count of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (5 year mandatory minimum), and one count of violating 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(C) (20 year statutory maximum). Applying §4B1.1(c), the court determines that a sentence of 327 months is appropriate (applicable guideline range of 262-327). The court then imposes a sentence of 240 months on the 21 U.S.C. § 841 count and a sentence of 87 months on the 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) count to run consecutively to the sentence on the 21 U.S.C. § 841 count.

(iii) The defendant is convicted of two counts of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (5 year mandatory minimum on first count, 25 year mandatory minimum on second count) and one count of violating 18 U.S.C. § 113(a)(3) (10 year statutory maximum). Applying §4B1.1(c), the court determines that a sentence of 460 months is appropriate (applicable guideline range of 460-485 months). The court then imposes (I) a sentence of 60 months on the first 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) count (II) a sentence of 300 months on the second 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) count and (III) a sentence of 100 months on the 18 U.S.C. § 113(a)(3) count. The sentence on each count is imposed to run consecutively to the other counts.

Historical Note: Effective November 1, 1987. Amended effective November 1, 1989 (amendments 287 and 288) November 1, 1994 (amendment 507) November 1, 1998 (amendment 579) November 1, 2000 (amendment 598) November 1, 2002 (amendment 642) November 1, 2004 (amendment 674) November 1, 2005 (amendments 677 and 680) November 1, 2010 (amendment 747) November 1, 2012 (amendments 767 and 770).

§5G1.3. Imposition of a Sentence on a Defendant Subject to an Undischarged Term of Imprisonment or Anticipated State Term of Imprisonment

(a) If the instant offense was committed while the defendant was serving a term of imprisonment (including work release, furlough, or escape status) or after sentencing for, but before commencing service of, such term of imprisonment, the sentence for the instant offense shall be imposed to run consecutively to the undischarged term of imprisonment.

(b) If subsection (a) does not apply, and a term of imprisonment resulted from another offense that is relevant conduct to the instant offense of conviction under the provisions of subsections (a)(1), (a)(2), or (a)(3) of §1B1.3 (Relevant Conduct), the sentence for the instant offense shall be imposed as follows:

(1) the court shall adjust the sentence for any period of imprisonment already served on the undischarged term of imprisonment if the court determines that such period of imprisonment will not be credited to the federal sentence by the Bureau of Prisons and

(2) the sentence for the instant offense shall be imposed to run concurrently to the remainder of the undischarged term of imprisonment.

(c) If subsection (a) does not apply, and a state term of imprisonment is anticipated to result from another offense that is relevant conduct to the instant offense of conviction under the provisions of subsections (a)(1), (a)(2), or (a)(3) of §1B1.3 (Relevant Conduct), the sentence for the instant offense shall be imposed to run concurrently to the anticipated term of imprisonment.

(d) (Policy Statement) In any other case involving an undischarged term of imprisonment, the sentence for the instant offense may be imposed to run concurrently, partially concurrently, or consecutively to the prior undischarged term of imprisonment to achieve a reasonable punishment for the instant offense.

1. Consecutive Sentence - Subsection (a) Cases. Under subsection (a), the court shall impose a consecutive sentence when the instant offense was committed while the defendant was serving an undischarged term of imprisonment or after sentencing for, but before commencing service of, such term of imprisonment.

2. Application of Subsection (b).—

(A) In General.—Subsection (b) applies in cases in which all of the prior offense is relevant conduct to the instant offense under the provisions of subsection (a)(1), (a)(2), or (a)(3) of §1B1.3 (Relevant Conduct). Cases in which only part of the prior offense is relevant conduct to the instant offense are covered under subsection (d).

(B) Inapplicability of Subsection (b).—Subsection (b) does not apply in cases in which the prior offense was not relevant conduct to the instant offense under §1B1.3(a)(1), (a)(2), or (a)(3) (e.g., the prior offense is a prior conviction for which the defendant received an increase under §2L1.2 (Unlawfully Entering or Remaining in the United States), or the prior offense was a crime of violence for which the defendant received an increased base offense level under §2K2.1 (Unlawful Receipt, Possession, or Transportation of Firearms or Ammunition Prohibited Transactions Involving Firearms or Ammunition)).

(C) Imposition of Sentence.—If subsection (b) applies, and the court adjusts the sentence for a period of time already served, the court should note on the Judgment in a Criminal Case Order (i) the applicable subsection (e.g., §5G1.3(b)) (ii) the amount of time by which the sentence is being adjusted (iii) the undischarged term of imprisonment for which the adjustment is being given and (iv) that the sentence imposed is a sentence reduction pursuant to §5G1.3(b) for a period of imprisonment that will not be credited by the Bureau of Prisons.

(D) Example.—The following is an example in which subsection (b) applies and an adjustment to the sentence is appropriate:

The defendant is convicted of a federal offense charging the sale of 90 grams of cocaine. Under §1B1.3, the defendant is held accountable for the sale of an additional 25 grams of cocaine, an offense for which the defendant has been convicted and sentenced in state court. The defendant received a nine-month sentence of imprisonment for the state offense and has served six months on that sentence at the time of sentencing on the instant federal offense. The guideline range applicable to the defendant is 12–18 months (Chapter Two offense level of level 16 for sale of 115 grams of cocaine 3 level reduction for acceptance of responsibility final offense level of level 13 Criminal History Category I). The court determines that a sentence of 13 months provides the appropriate total punishment. Because the defendant has already served six months on the related state charge as of the date of sentencing on the instant federal offense, a sentence of seven months, imposed to run concurrently with the three months remaining on the defendant's state sentence, achieves this result.

3. Application of Subsection (c).—Subsection (c) applies to cases in which the federal court anticipates that, after the federal sentence is imposed, the defendant will be sentenced in state court and serve a state sentence before being transferred to federal custody for federal imprisonment. In such a case, where the other offense is relevant conduct to the instant offense of conviction under the provisions of subsections (a)(1), (a)(2), or (a)(3) of §1B1.3 (Relevant Conduct), the sentence for the instant offense shall be imposed to run concurrently to the anticipated term of imprisonment.

4. Application of Subsection (d).—

(A) In General.—Under subsection (d), the court may impose a sentence concurrently, partially concurrently, or consecutively to the undischarged term of imprisonment. In order to achieve a reasonable incremental punishment for the instant offense and avoid unwarranted disparity, the court should consider the following:

(i) the factors set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 3584 (referencing 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a))

(ii) the type (e.g., determinate, indeterminate/parolable) and length of the prior undischarged sentence

(iii) the time served on the undischarged sentence and the time likely to be served before release

(iv) the fact that the prior undischarged sentence may have been imposed in state court rather than federal court, or at a different time before the same or different federal court and

(v) any other circumstance relevant to the determination of an appropriate sentence for the instant offense.

(B) Partially Concurrent Sentence.—In some cases under subsection (d), a partially concurrent sentence may achieve most appropriately the desired result. To impose a partially concurrent sentence, the court may provide in the Judgment in a Criminal Case Order that the sentence for the instant offense shall commence on the earlier of (i) when the defendant is released from the prior undischarged sentence or (ii) on a specified date. This order provides for a fully consecutive sentence if the defendant is released on the undischarged term of imprisonment on or before the date specified in the order, and a partially concurrent sentence if the defendant is not released on the undischarged term of imprisonment by that date.

(C) Undischarged Terms of Imprisonment Resulting from Revocations of Probation, Parole or Supervised Release.—Subsection (d) applies in cases in which the defendant was on federal or state probation, parole, or supervised release at the time of the instant offense and has had such probation, parole, or supervised release revoked. Consistent with the policy set forth in Application Note 4 and subsection (f) of §7B1.3 (Revocation of Probation or Supervised Release), the Commission recommends that the sentence for the instant offense be imposed consecutively to the sentence imposed for the revocation.

(D) Complex Situations.—Occasionally, the court may be faced with a complex case in which a defendant may be subject to multiple undischarged terms of imprisonment that seemingly call for the application of different rules. In such a case, the court may exercise its discretion in accordance with subsection (d) to fashion a sentence of appropriate length and structure it to run in any appropriate manner to achieve a reasonable punishment for the instant offense.

(E) Downward Departure.—Unlike subsection (b), subsection (d) does not authorize an adjustment of the sentence for the instant offense for a period of imprisonment already served on the undischarged term of imprisonment. However, in an extraordinary case involving an undischarged term of imprisonment under subsection (d), it may be appropriate for the court to downwardly depart. This may occur, for example, in a case in which the defendant has served a very substantial period of imprisonment on an undischarged term of imprisonment that resulted from conduct only partially within the relevant conduct for the instant offense. In such a case, a downward departure may be warranted to ensure that the combined punishment is not increased unduly by the fortuity and timing of separate prosecutions and sentencings. Nevertheless, it is intended that a departure pursuant to this application note result in a sentence that ensures a reasonable incremental punishment for the instant offense of conviction.

To avoid confusion with the Bureau of Prisons' exclusive authority provided under 18 U.S.C. § 3585(b) to grant credit for time served under certain circumstances, the Commission recommends that any downward departure under this application note be clearly stated on the Judgment in a Criminal Case Order as a downward departure pursuant to §5G1.3(d), rather than as a credit for time served.

5. Downward Departure Provision.—In the case of a discharged term of imprisonment, a downward departure is not prohibited if the defendant (A) has completed serving a term of imprisonment and (B) subsection (b) would have provided an adjustment had that completed term of imprisonment been undischarged at the time of sentencing for the instant offense. See §5K2.23 (Discharged Terms of Imprisonment).

Background: Federal courts generally "have discretion to select whether the sentences they impose will run concurrently or consecutively with respect to other sentences that they impose, or that have been imposed in other proceedings, including state proceedings." See Setser v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 1463, 1468 (2012) 18 U.S.C. § 3584(a). Federal courts also generally have discretion to order that the sentences they impose will run concurrently with or consecutively to other state sentences that are anticipated but not yet imposed. See Setser, 132 S. Ct. at 1468. Exercise of that discretion, however, is predicated on the court's consideration of the factors listed in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a), including any applicable guidelines or policy statements issued by the Sentencing Commission.

Historical Note: Effective November 1, 1987. Amended effective November 1, 1989 (amendment 289) November 1, 1991 (amendment 385) November 1, 1992 (amendment 465) November 1, 1993 (amendment 494) November 1, 1995 (amendment 535) November 1, 2002 (amendment 645) November 1, 2003 (amendment 660) November 1, 2010 (amendment 747) November 1, 2013 (amendment 776) November 1, 2014 (amendments 782, 787, and 789) November 1, 2016 (amendment 802).

PART H - SPECIFIC OFFENDER CHARACTERISTICS

This Part addresses the relevance of certain specific offender characteristics in sentencing. The Sentencing Reform Act (the "Act") contains several provisions regarding specific offender characteristics:

First, the Act directs the Commission to ensure that the guidelines and policy statements "are entirely neutral" as to five characteristics – race, sex, national origin, creed, and socioeconomic status. See 28 U.S.C. § 994(d).

Second, the Act directs the Commission to consider whether eleven specific offender characteristics, "among others", have any relevance to the nature, extent, place of service, or other aspects of an appropriate sentence, and to take them into account in the guidelines and policy statements only to the extent that they do have relevance. See 28 U.S.C. § 994(d).

Third, the Act directs the Commission to ensure that the guidelines and policy statements, in recommending a term of imprisonment or length of a term of imprisonment, reflect the "general inappropriateness" of considering five of those characteristics – education vocational skills employment record family ties and responsibilities and community ties. See 28 U.S.C. § 994(e).

Fourth, the Act also directs the sentencing court, in determining the particular sentence to be imposed, to consider, among other factors, "the history and characteristics of the defendant". See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(1).

Specific offender characteristics are taken into account in the guidelines in several ways. One important specific offender characteristic is the defendant's criminal history, see 28 U.S.C. § 994(d)(10), which is taken into account in the guidelines in Chapter Four (Criminal History and Criminal Livelihood). See §5H1.8 (Criminal History). Another specific offender characteristic in the guidelines is the degree of dependence upon criminal history for a livelihood, see 28 U.S.C. § 994(d)(11), which is taken into account in Chapter Four, Part B (Career Offenders and Criminal Livelihood). See §5H1.9 (Dependence upon Criminal Activity for a Livelihood). Other specific offender characteristics are accounted for elsewhere in this manual. See, e.g., §§2C1.1(a)(1) and 2C1.2(a)(1) (providing alternative base offense levels if the defendant was a public official) 3B1.3 (Abuse of Position of Trust or Use of Special Skill) and 3E1.1 (Acceptance of Responsibility).

The Supreme Court has emphasized that the advisory guideline system should "continue to move sentencing in Congress' preferred direction, helping to avoid excessive sentencing disparities while maintaining flexibility sufficient to individualize sentences where necessary." See United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 264-65 (2005). Although the court must consider "the history and characteristics of the defendant" among other factors, see 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a), in order to avoid unwarranted sentencing disparities the court should not give them excessive weight. Generally, the most appropriate use of specific offender characteristics is to consider them not as a reason for a sentence outside the applicable guideline range but for other reasons, such as in determining the sentence within the applicable guideline range, the type of sentence (e.g., probation or imprisonment) within the sentencing options available for the applicable Zone on the Sentencing Table, and various other aspects of an appropriate sentence. To avoid unwarranted sentencing disparities among defendants with similar records who have been found guilty of similar conduct, see 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(6), 28 U.S.C. § 991(b)(1)(B), the guideline range, which reflects the defendant's criminal conduct and the defendant's criminal history, should continue to be "the starting point and the initial benchmark." Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 49 (2007).

Accordingly, the purpose of this Part is to provide sentencing courts with a framework for addressing specific offender characteristics in a reasonably consistent manner. Using such a framework in a uniform manner will help "secure nationwide consistency," see Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 49 (2007), "avoid unwarranted sentencing disparities," see 28 U.S.C. § 991(b)(1)(B), 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(6), "provide certainty and fairness," see 28 U.S.C. § 991(b)(1)(B), and "promote respect for the law," see 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2)(A).

This Part allocates specific offender characteristics into three general categories.

In the first category are specific offender characteristics the consideration of which Congress has prohibited (e.g., §5H1.10 (Race, Sex, National Origin, Creed, Religion, and Socio-Economic Status)) or that the Commission has determined should be prohibited.

In the second category are specific offender characteristics that Congress directed the Commission to take into account in the guidelines only to the extent that they have relevance to sentencing. See 28 U.S.C. § 994(d). For some of these, the policy statements indicate that these characteristics may be relevant in determining whether a sentence outside the applicable guideline range is warranted (e.g., age mental and emotional condition physical condition). These characteristics may warrant a sentence outside the applicable guideline range if the characteristic, individually or in combination with other such characteristics, is present to an unusual degree and distinguishes the case from the typical cases covered by the guidelines. These specific offender characteristics also may be considered for other reasons, such as in determining the sentence within the applicable guideline range, the type of sentence (e.g., probation or imprisonment) within the sentencing options available for the applicable Zone on the Sentencing Table, and various other aspects of an appropriate sentence.

In the third category are specific offender characteristics that Congress directed the Commission to ensure are reflected in the guidelines and policy statements as generally inappropriate in recommending a term of imprisonment or length of a term of imprisonment. See 28 U.S.C. § 994(e). The policy statements indicate that these characteristics are not ordinarily relevant to the determination of whether a sentence should be outside the applicable guideline range. Unless expressly stated, this does not mean that the Commission views such circumstances as necessarily inappropriate to the determination of the sentence within the applicable guideline range, the type of sentence (e.g., probation or imprisonment) within the sentencing options available for the applicable Zone on the Sentencing Table, or various other aspects of an appropriate sentence (e.g., the appropriate conditions of probation or supervised release). Furthermore, although these circumstances are not ordinarily relevant to the determination of whether a sentence should be outside the applicable guideline range, they may be relevant to this determination in exceptional cases. They also may be relevant if a combination of such circumstances makes the case an exceptional one, but only if each such circumstance is identified as an affirmative ground for departure and is present in the case to a substantial degree. See §5K2.0 (Grounds for Departure).

As with the other provisions in this manual, these policy statements "are evolutionary in nature". See Chapter One, Part A, Subpart 2 (Continuing Evolution and Role of the Guidelines) 28 U.S.C. § 994(o). The Commission expects, and the Sentencing Reform Act contemplates, that continuing research, experience, and analysis will result in modifications and revisions.

The nature, extent, and significance of specific offender characteristics can involve a range of considerations. The Commission will continue to provide information to the courts on the relevance of specific offender characteristics in sentencing, as the Sentencing Reform Act contemplates. See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. § 995(a)(12)(A) (the Commission serves as a "clearinghouse and information center" on federal sentencing). Among other things, this may include information on the use of specific offender characteristics, individually and in combination, in determining the sentence to be imposed (including, where available, information on rates of use, criteria for use, and reasons for use) the relationship, if any, between specific offender characteristics and (A) the "forbidden factors" specified in 28 U.S.C. § 994(d) and (B) the "discouraged factors" specified in 28 U.S.C. § 994(e) and the relationship, if any, between specific offender characteristics and the statutory purposes of sentencing.

Historical Note: Effective November 1, 1987. Amended effective November 1, 1990 (amendment 357) November 1, 1991 (amendment 386) November 1, 1994 (amendment 508) October 27, 2003 (amendment 651) November 1, 2010 (amendment 739).

§5H1.1. Age (Policy Statement)

Age (including youth) may be relevant in determining whether a departure is warranted, if considerations based on age, individually or in combination with other offender characteristics, are present to an unusual degree and distinguish the case from the typical cases covered by the guidelines. Age may be a reason to depart downward in a case in which the defendant is elderly and infirm and where a form of punishment such as home confinement might be equally efficient as and less costly than incarceration. Physical condition, which may be related to age, is addressed at §5H1.4 (Physical Condition, Including Drug or Alcohol Dependence or Abuse Gambling Addiction).

Historical Note: Effective November 1, 1987. Amended effective November 1, 1991 (amendment 386) November 1, 1993 (amendment 475) October 27, 2003 (amendment 651) November 1, 2004 (amendment 674) November 1, 2010 (amendment 739).

§5H1.2. Education and Vocational Skills (Policy Statement)

Education and vocational skills are not ordinarily relevant in determining whether a departure is warranted, but the extent to which a defendant may have misused special training or education to facilitate criminal activity is an express guideline factor. See §3B1.3 (Abuse of Position of Trust or Use of Special Skill).

Education and vocational skills may be relevant in determining the conditions of probation or supervised release for rehabilitative purposes, for public protection by restricting activities that allow for the utilization of a certain skill, or in determining the appropriate type of community service.

Historical Note: Effective November 1, 1987. Amended effective November 1, 1991 (amendment 386) November 1, 2004 (amendment 674).

§5H1.3. Mental and Emotional Conditions (Policy Statement)

Mental and emotional conditions may be relevant in determining whether a departure is warranted, if such conditions, individually or in combination with other offender characteristics, are present to an unusual degree and distinguish the case from the typical cases covered by the guidelines. See also Chapter Five, Part K, Subpart 2 (Other Grounds for Departure).

In certain cases a downward departure may be appropriate to accomplish a specific treatment purpose. See §5C1.1, Application Note 7.

Mental and emotional conditions may be relevant in determining the conditions of probation or supervised release e.g., participation in a mental health program (see §§5B1.3(d)(5) and 5D1.3(d)(5)).

Historical Note: Effective November 1, 1987. Amended effective November 1, 1991 (amendment 386) November 1, 1997 (amendment 569) November 1, 2004 (amendment 674) November 1, 2010 (amendment 739) November 1, 2018 (amendment 811).

§5H1.4. Physical Condition, Including Drug or Alcohol Dependence or Abuse Gambling Addiction (Policy Statement)

Physical condition or appearance, including physique, may be relevant in determining whether a departure is warranted, if the condition or appearance, individually or in combination with other offender characteristics, is present to an unusual degree and distinguishes the case from the typical cases covered by the guidelines. An extraordinary physical impairment may be a reason to depart downward e.g., in the case of a seriously infirm defendant, home detention may be as efficient as, and less costly than, imprisonment.

Drug or alcohol dependence or abuse ordinarily is not a reason for a downward departure. Substance abuse is highly correlated to an increased propensity to commit crime. Due to this increased risk, it is highly recommended that a defendant who is incarcerated also be sentenced to supervised release with a requirement that the defendant participate in an appropriate substance abuse program (see §5D1.3(d)(4)). If participation in a substance abuse program is required, the length of supervised release should take into account the length of time necessary for the probation office to judge the success of the program.

In certain cases a downward departure may be appropriate to accomplish a specific treatment purpose. See §5C1.1, Application Note 7.

In a case in which a defendant who is a substance abuser is sentenced to probation, it is strongly recommended that the conditions of probation contain a requirement that the defendant participate in an appropriate substance abuse program (see §5B1.3(d)(4)).

Addiction to gambling is not a reason for a downward departure.

Historical Note: Effective November 1, 1987. Amended effective November 1, 1991 (amendment 386) November 1, 1997 (amendment 569) October 27, 2003 (amendment 651) November 1, 2010 (amendment 739) November 1, 2018 (amendment 811).

§5H1.5. Employment Record (Policy Statement)

Employment record is not ordinarily relevant in determining whether a departure is warranted.

Employment record may be relevant in determining the conditions of probation or supervised release (e.g., the appropriate hours of home detention).

Historical Note: Effective November 1, 1987. Amended effective November 1, 1991 (amendment 386) November 1, 2004 (amendment 674).

§5H1.6. Family Ties and Responsibilities (Policy Statement)

In sentencing a defendant convicted of an offense other than an offense described in the following paragraph, family ties and responsibilities are not ordinarily relevant in determining whether a departure may be warranted.

In sentencing a defendant convicted of an offense involving a minor victim under section 1201, an offense under section 1591, or an offense under chapter 71, 109A, 110, or 117, of title 18, United States Code, family ties and responsibilities and community ties are not relevant in determining whether a sentence should be below the applicable guideline range.

Family responsibilities that are complied with may be relevant to the determination of the amount of restitution or fine.

1. Circumstances to Consider.—

(A) In General.—In determining whether a departure is warranted under this policy statement, the court shall consider the following non-exhaustive list of circumstances:

(i) The seriousness of the offense.

(ii) The involvement in the offense, if any, of members of the defendant's family.

(iii) The danger, if any, to members of the defendant's family as a result of the offense.

(B) Departures Based on Loss of Caretaking or Financial Support.—A departure under this policy statement based on the loss of caretaking or financial support of the defendant's family requires, in addition to the court's consideration of the non-exhaustive list of circumstances in subdivision (A), the presence of the following circumstances:

(i) The defendant's service of a sentence within the applicable guideline range will cause a substantial, direct, and specific loss of essential caretaking, or essential financial support, to the defendant's family.

(ii) The loss of caretaking or financial support substantially exceeds the harm ordinarily incident to incarceration for a similarly situated defendant. For example, the fact that the defendant's family might incur some degree of financial hardship or suffer to some extent from the absence of a parent through incarceration is not in itself sufficient as a basis for departure because such hardship or suffering is of a sort ordinarily incident to incarceration.

(iii) The loss of caretaking or financial support is one for which no effective remedial or ameliorative programs reasonably are available, making the defendant's caretaking or financial support irreplaceable to the defendant's family.

(iv) The departure effectively will address the loss of caretaking or financial support.

Background: Section 401(b)(4) of Public Law 108–21 directly amended this policy statement to add the second paragraph, effective April 30, 2003.

Historical Note: Effective November 1, 1987. Amended effective November 1, 1991 (amendment 386) April 30, 2003 (amendment 649) October 27, 2003 (amendment 651) November 1, 2004 (amendment 674).

§5H1.7. Role in the Offense (Policy Statement)

A defendant's role in the offense is relevant in determining the applicable guideline range (see Chapter Three, Part B (Role in the Offense)) but is not a basis for departing from that range (see subsection (d) of §5K2.0 (Grounds for Departures)).

Historical Note: Effective November 1, 1987. Amended effective October 27, 2003 (amendment 651).

§5H1.8. Criminal History (Policy Statement)

A defendant's criminal history is relevant in determining the applicable criminal history category. See Chapter Four (Criminal History and Criminal Livelihood). For grounds of departure based on the defendant's criminal history, see §4A1.3 (Departures Based on Inadequacy of Criminal History Category).

Historical Note: Effective November 1, 1987. Amended effective October 27, 2003 (amendment 651).

§5H1.9. Dependence upon Criminal Activity for a Livelihood (Policy Statement)

The degree to which a defendant depends upon criminal activity for a livelihood is relevant in determining the appropriate sentence. See Chapter Four, Part B (Career Offenders and Criminal Livelihood).

Historical Note: Effective November 1, 1987.

§5H1.10. Race, Sex, National Origin, Creed, Religion, and Socio-Economic Status (Policy Statement)

These factors are not relevant in the determination of a sentence.

Historical Note: Effective November 1, 1987.

§5H1.11. Military, Civic, Charitable, or Public Service Employment-Related Contributions Record of Prior Good Works (Policy Statement)

Military service may be relevant in determining whether a departure is warranted, if the military service, individually or in combination with other offender characteristics, is present to an unusual degree and distinguishes the case from the typical cases covered by the guidelines.

Civic, charitable, or public service employment-related contributions and similar prior good works are not ordinarily relevant in determining whether a departure is warranted.

Historical Note: Effective November 1, 1991 (amendment 386). Amended effective November 1, 2004 (amendment 674) November 1, 2010 (amendment 739).

§5H1.12. Lack of Guidance as a Youth and Similar Circumstances (Policy Statement)

Lack of guidance as a youth and similar circumstances indicating a disadvantaged upbringing are not relevant grounds in determining whether a departure is warranted.

Historical Note: Effective November 1, 1992 (amendment 466). Amended effective November 1, 2004 (amendment 674).

PART J - RELIEF FROM DISABILITY

Historical Note: Effective November 1, 1987. Amended effective June 15, 1988 (amendment 55).

§5J1.1. Relief from Disability Pertaining to Convicted Persons Prohibited from Holding Certain Positions (Policy Statement)

A collateral consequence of conviction of certain crimes described in 29 U.S.C. §§ 504 and 1111 is the prohibition of convicted persons from service and employment with labor unions, employer associations, employee pension and welfare benefit plans, and as labor relations consultants in the private sector. A convicted person's prohibited service or employment in such capacities without having been granted one of the following three statutory procedures of administrative or judicial relief is subject to criminal prosecution. First, a disqualified person whose citizenship rights have been fully restored to him or her in the jurisdiction of conviction, following the revocation of such rights as a result of the disqualifying conviction, is relieved of the disability. Second, a disqualified person convicted after October 12, 1984, may petition the sentencing court to reduce the statutory length of disability (thirteen years after date of sentencing or release from imprisonment, whichever is later) to a lesser period (not less than three years after date of conviction or release from imprisonment, whichever is later). Third, a disqualified person may petition either the United States Parole Commission or a United States District Court judge to exempt his or her service or employment in a particular prohibited capacity pursuant to the procedures set forth in 29 U.S.C. §§ 504(a)(B) and 1111(a)(B). In the case of a person convicted of a disqualifying crime committed before November 1, 1987, the United States Parole Commission will continue to process such exemption applications.

In the case of a person convicted of a disqualifying crime committed on or after November 1, 1987, however, a petition for exemption from disability must be directed to a United States District Court. If the petitioner was convicted of a disqualifying federal offense, the petition is directed to the sentencing judge. If the petitioner was convicted of a disqualifying state or local offense, the petition is directed to the United States District Court for the district in which the offense was committed. In such cases, relief shall not be given to aid rehabilitation, but may be granted only following a clear demonstration by the convicted person that he or she has been rehabilitated since commission of the disqualifying crime and can therefore be trusted not to endanger the organization in the position for which he or she seeks relief from disability.

Historical Note: Effective November 1, 1987. Amended effective June 15, 1988 (amendment 56).

PART K - DEPARTURES

1. SUBSTANTIAL ASSISTANCE TO AUTHORITIES

§5K1.1. Substantial Assistance to Authorities (Policy Statement)

Upon motion of the government stating that the defendant has provided substantial assistance in the investigation or prosecution of another person who has committed an offense, the court may depart from the guidelines.

(a) The appropriate reduction shall be determined by the court for reasons stated that may include, but are not limited to, consideration of the following:

(1) the court's evaluation of the significance and usefulness of the defendant's assistance, taking into consideration the government's evaluation of the assistance rendered

(2) the truthfulness, completeness, and reliability of any information or testimony provided by the defendant

(3) the nature and extent of the defendant's assistance

(4) any injury suffered, or any danger or risk of injury to the defendant or his family resulting from his assistance

(5) the timeliness of the defendant's assistance.

1. Under circumstances set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(e) and 28 U.S.C. § 994(n), as amended, substantial assistance in the investigation or prosecution of another person who has committed an offense may justify a sentence below a statutorily required minimum sentence.

2. The sentencing reduction for assistance to authorities shall be considered independently of any reduction for acceptance of responsibility. Substantial assistance is directed to the investigation and prosecution of criminal activities by persons other than the defendant, while acceptance of responsibility is directed to the defendant's affirmative recognition of responsibility for his own conduct.

3. Substantial weight should be given to the government's evaluation of the extent of the defendant's assistance, particularly where the extent and value of the assistance are difficult to ascertain.

Background: A defendant's assistance to authorities in the investigation of criminal activities has been recognized in practice and by statute as a mitigating sentencing factor. The nature, extent, and significance of assistance can involve a broad spectrum of conduct that must be evaluated by the court on an individual basis. Latitude is, therefore, afforded the sentencing judge to reduce a sentence based upon variable relevant factors, including those listed above. The sentencing judge must, however, state the reasons for reducing a sentence under this section. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(c). The court may elect to provide its reasons to the defendant in camera and in writing under seal for the safety of the defendant or to avoid disclosure of an ongoing investigation.

Historical Note: Effective November 1, 1987. Amended effective November 1, 1989 (amendment 290).

§5K1.2. Refusal to Assist (Policy Statement)

A defendant's refusal to assist authorities in the investigation of other persons may not be considered as an aggravating sentencing factor.

Historical Note: Effective November 1, 1987. Amended effective November 1, 1989 (amendment 291).

2. OTHER GROUNDS FOR DEPARTURE

Historical Note: Effective November 1, 1987. Amended effective November 1, 1990 (amendment 358).

§5K2.0. Grounds for Departure (Policy Statement)

(a) UPWARD DEPARTURES IN GENERAL AND DOWNWARD DEPARTURES IN CRIMINAL CASES OTHER THAN CHILD CRIMES AND SEXUAL OFFENSES.—

(1) IN GENERAL.—The sentencing court may depart from the applicable guideline range if—

(A) in the case of offenses other than child crimes and sexual offenses, the court finds, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3553(b)(1), that there exists an aggravating or mitigating circumstance or

(B) in the case of child crimes and sexual offenses, the court finds, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3553(b)(2)(A)(i), that there exists an aggravating circumstance,

of a kind, or to a degree, not adequately taken into consideration by the Sentencing Commission in formulating the guidelines that, in order to advance the objectives set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2), should result in a sentence different from that described.

(2) DEPARTURES BASED ON CIRCUMSTANCES OF A KIND NOT ADEQUATELY TAKEN INTO CONSIDERATION.—

(A) IDENTIFIED CIRCUMSTANCES.—This subpart (Chapter Five, Part K, Subpart 2 (Other Grounds for Departure)) identifies some of the circumstances that the Commission may have not adequately taken into consideration in determining the applicable guideline range (e.g., as a specific offense characteristic or other adjustment). If any such circumstance is present in the case and has not adequately been taken into consideration in determining the applicable guideline range, a departure consistent with 18 U.S.C. § 3553(b) and the provisions of this subpart may be warranted.

(B) UNIDENTIFIED CIRCUMSTANCES.—A departure may be warranted in the exceptional case in which there is present a circumstance that the Commission has not identified in the guidelines but that nevertheless is relevant to determining the appropriate sentence.

(3) DEPARTURES BASED ON CIRCUMSTANCES PRESENT TO A DEGREE NOT ADEQUATELY TAKEN INTO CONSIDERATION.—A departure may be warranted in an exceptional case, even though the circumstance that forms the basis for the departure is taken into consideration in determining the guideline range, if the court determines that such circumstance is present in the offense to a degree substantially in excess of, or substantially below, that which ordinarily is involved in that kind of offense.

(4) DEPARTURES BASED ON NOT ORDINARILY RELEVANT OFFENDER CHARACTERISTICS AND OTHER CIRCUMSTANCES.—An offender characteristic or other circumstance identified in Chapter Five, Part H (Offender Characteristics) or elsewhere in the guidelines as not ordinarily relevant in determining whether a departure is warranted may be relevant to this determination only if such offender characteristic or other circumstance is present to an exceptional degree.

(b) DOWNWARD DEPARTURES IN CHILD CRIMES AND SEXUAL OFFENSES.—Under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(b)(2)(A)(ii), the sentencing court may impose a sentence below the range established by the applicable guidelines only if the court finds that there exists a mitigating circumstance of a kind, or to a degree, that—

(1) has been affirmatively and specifically identified as a permissible ground of downward departure in the sentencing guidelines or policy statements issued under section 994(a) of title 28, United States Code, taking account of any amendments to such sentencing guidelines or policy statements by act of Congress

(2) has not adequately been taken into consideration by the Sentencing Commission in formulating the guidelines and

(3) should result in a sentence different from that described.

The grounds enumerated in this Part K of Chapter Five are the sole grounds that have been affirmatively and specifically identified as a permissible ground of downward departure in these sentencing guidelines and policy statements. Thus, notwithstanding any other reference to authority to depart downward elsewhere in this Sentencing Manual, a ground of downward departure has not been affirmatively and specifically identified as a permissible ground of downward departure within the meaning of section 3553(b)(2) unless it is expressly enumerated in this Part K as a ground upon which a downward departure may be granted.

(c) LIMITATION ON DEPARTURES BASED ON MULTIPLE CIRCUMSTANCES.—The court may depart from the applicable guideline range based on a combination of two or more offender characteristics or other circumstances, none of which independently is sufficient to provide a basis for departure, only if—

(1) such offender characteristics or other circumstances, taken together, make the case an exceptional one and

(2) each such offender characteristic or other circumstance is—

(A) present to a substantial degree and

(B) identified in the guidelines as a permissible ground for departure, even if such offender characteristic or other circumstance is not ordinarily relevant to a determination of whether a departure is warranted.

(d) PROHIBITED DEPARTURES.—Notwithstanding subsections (a) and (b) of this policy statement, or any other provision in the guidelines, the court may not depart from the applicable guideline range based on any of the following circumstances:

(1) Any circumstance specifically prohibited as a ground for departure in §§5H1.10 (Race, Sex, National Origin, Creed, Religion, and Socio-Economic Status), 5H1.12 (Lack of Guidance as a Youth and Similar Circumstances), the last sentence of 5H1.4 (Physical Condition, Including Drug or Alcohol Dependence or Abuse Gambling Addiction), and the last sentence of 5K2.12 (Coercion and Duress).

(2) The defendant's acceptance of responsibility for the offense, which may be taken into account only under §3E1.1 (Acceptance of Responsibility).

(3) The defendant's aggravating or mitigating role in the offense, which may be taken into account only under §3B1.1 (Aggravating Role) or §3B1.2 (Mitigating Role), respectively.

(4) The defendant's decision, in and of itself, to plead guilty to the offense or to enter a plea agreement with respect to the offense (i.e., a departure may not be based merely on the fact that the defendant decided to plead guilty or to enter into a plea agreement, but a departure may be based on justifiable, non-prohibited reasons as part of a sentence that is recommended, or agreed to, in the plea agreement and accepted by the court. See §6B1.2 (Standards for Acceptance of Plea Agreement).

(5) The defendant's fulfillment of restitution obligations only to the extent required by law including the guidelines (i.e., a departure may not be based on unexceptional efforts to remedy the harm caused by the offense).

(6) Any other circumstance specifically prohibited as a ground for departure in the guidelines.

(e) REQUIREMENT OF SPECIFIC WRITTEN REASONS FOR DEPARTURE.—If the court departs from the applicable guideline range, it shall state, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3553(c), its specific reasons for departure in open court at the time of sentencing and, with limited exception in the case of statements received in camera, shall state those reasons with specificity in the statement of reasons form.

1. Definitions.—For purposes of this policy statement:

"Circumstance" includes, as appropriate, an offender characteristic or any other offense factor.

"Depart", "departure", "downward departure", and "upward departure" have the meaning given those terms in Application Note 1 of the Commentary to §1B1.1 (Application Instructions).

2. Scope of this Policy Statement.—

(A) Departures Covered by this Policy Statement.—This policy statement covers departures from the applicable guideline range based on offense characteristics or offender characteristics of a kind, or to a degree, not adequately taken into consideration in determining that range. See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(b).

Subsection (a) of this policy statement applies to upward departures in all cases covered by the guidelines and to downward departures in all such cases except for downward departures in child crimes and sexual offenses.

Subsection (b) of this policy statement applies only to downward departures in child crimes and sexual offenses.

(B) Departures Covered by Other Guidelines.—This policy statement does not cover the following departures, which are addressed elsewhere in the guidelines: (i) departures based on the defendant's criminal history (see Chapter Four (Criminal History and Criminal Livelihood), particularly §4A1.3 (Departures Based on Inadequacy of Criminal History Category)) (ii) departures based on the defendant's substantial assistance to the authorities (see §5K1.1 (Substantial Assistance to Authorities)) and (iii) departures based on early disposition programs (see §5K3.1 (Early Disposition Programs)).

3. Kinds and Expected Frequency of Departures under Subsection (a).—As set forth in subsection (a), there generally are two kinds of departures from the guidelines based on offense characteristics and/or offender characteristics: (A) departures based on circumstances of a kind not adequately taken into consideration in the guidelines and (B) departures based on circumstances that are present to a degree not adequately taken into consideration in the guidelines.

(A) Departures Based on Circumstances of a Kind Not Adequately Taken into Account in Guidelines.—Subsection (a)(2) authorizes the court to depart if there exists an aggravating or a mitigating circumstance in a case under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(b)(1), or an aggravating circumstance in a case under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(b)(2)(A)(i), of a kind not adequately taken into consideration in the guidelines.

(i) Identified Circumstances.—This subpart (Chapter Five, Part K, Subpart 2) identifies several circumstances that the Commission may have not adequately taken into consideration in setting the offense level for certain cases. Offense guidelines in Chapter Two (Offense Conduct) and adjustments in Chapter Three (Adjustments) sometimes identify circumstances the Commission may have not adequately taken into consideration in setting the offense level for offenses covered by those guidelines. If the offense guideline in Chapter Two or an adjustment in Chapter Three does not adequately take that circumstance into consideration in setting the offense level for the offense, and only to the extent not adequately taken into consideration, a departure based on that circumstance may be warranted.

(ii) Unidentified Circumstances.—A case may involve circumstances, in addition to those identified by the guidelines, that have not adequately been taken into consideration by the Commission, and the presence of any such circumstance may warrant departure from the guidelines in that case. However, inasmuch as the Commission has continued to monitor and refine the guidelines since their inception to take into consideration relevant circumstances in sentencing, it is expected that departures based on such unidentified circumstances will occur rarely and only in exceptional cases.

(B) Departures Based on Circumstances Present to a Degree Not Adequately Taken into Consideration in Guidelines.—

(i) In General.—Subsection (a)(3) authorizes the court to depart if there exists an aggravating or a mitigating circumstance in a case under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(b)(1), or an aggravating circumstance in a case under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(b)(2)(A)(i), to a degree not adequately taken into consideration in the guidelines. However, inasmuch as the Commission has continued to monitor and refine the guidelines since their inception to determine the most appropriate weight to be accorded the mitigating and aggravating circumstances specified in the guidelines, it is expected that departures based on the weight accorded to any such circumstance will occur rarely and only in exceptional cases.

(ii) Examples.—As set forth in subsection (a)(3), if the applicable offense guideline and adjustments take into consideration a circumstance identified in this subpart, departure is warranted only if the circumstance is present to a degree substantially in excess of that which ordinarily is involved in the offense. Accordingly, a departure pursuant to §5K2.7 for the disruption of a governmental function would have to be substantial to warrant departure from the guidelines when the applicable offense guideline is bribery or obstruction of justice. When the guideline covering the mailing of injurious articles is applicable, however, and the offense caused disruption of a governmental function, departure from the applicable guideline range more readily would be appropriate. Similarly, physical injury would not warrant departure from the guidelines when the robbery offense guideline is applicable because the robbery guideline includes a specific adjustment based on the extent of any injury. However, because the robbery guideline does not deal with injury to more than one victim, departure may be warranted if several persons were injured.

(C) Departures Based on Circumstances Identified as Not Ordinarily Relevant.—Because certain circumstances are specified in the guidelines as not ordinarily relevant to sentencing (see, e.g., Chapter Five, Part H (Specific Offender Characteristics)), a departure based on any one of such circumstances should occur only in exceptional cases, and only if the circumstance is present in the case to an exceptional degree. If two or more of such circumstances each is present in the case to a substantial degree, however, and taken together make the case an exceptional one, the court may consider whether a departure would be warranted pursuant to subsection (c). Departures based on a combination of not ordinarily relevant circumstances that are present to a substantial degree should occur extremely rarely and only in exceptional cases.

In addition, as required by subsection (e), each circumstance forming the basis for a departure described in this subdivision shall be stated with specificity in the statement of reasons form.

4. Downward Departures in Child Crimes and Sexual Offenses.—

(A) Definition.—For purposes of this policy statement, the term "child crimes and sexual offenses" means offenses under any of the following: 18 U.S.C. § 1201 (involving a minor victim), 18 U.S.C. § 1591, or chapter 71, 109A, 110, or 117 of title 18, United States Code.

(i) Requirement of Affirmative and Specific Identification of Departure Ground.— The standard for a downward departure in child crimes and sexual offenses differs from the standard for other departures under this policy statement in that it includes a requirement, set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(b)(2)(A)(ii)(I) and subsection (b)(1) of this guideline, that any mitigating circumstance that forms the basis for such a downward departure be affirmatively and specifically identified as a ground for downward departure in this part (i.e., Chapter Five, Part K).

(ii) Application of Subsection (b)(2).—The commentary in Application Note 3 of this policy statement, except for the commentary in Application Note 3(A)(ii) relating to unidentified circumstances, shall apply to the court's determination of whether a case meets the requirement, set forth in subsection 18 U.S.C. § 3553(b)(2)(A)(ii)(II) and subsection (b)(2) of this policy statement, that the mitigating circumstance forming the basis for a downward departure in child crimes and sexual offenses be of kind, or to a degree, not adequately taken into consideration by the Commission.

5. Departures Based on Plea Agreements.—Subsection (d)(4) prohibits a downward departure based only on the defendant's decision, in and of itself, to plead guilty to the offense or to enter a plea agreement with respect to the offense. Even though a departure may not be based merely on the fact that the defendant agreed to plead guilty or enter a plea agreement, a departure may be based on justifiable, non-prohibited reasons for departure as part of a sentence that is recommended, or agreed to, in the plea agreement and accepted by the court. See §6B1.2 (Standards for Acceptance of Plea Agreements). In cases in which the court departs based on such reasons as set forth in the plea agreement, the court must state the reasons for departure with specificity in the statement of reasons form, as required by subsection (e).

Background: This policy statement sets forth the standards for departing from the applicable guideline range based on offense and offender characteristics of a kind, or to a degree, not adequately considered by the Commission. Circumstances the Commission has determined are not ordinarily relevant to determining whether a departure is warranted or are prohibited as bases for departure are addressed in Chapter Five, Part H (Offender Characteristics) and in this policy statement. Other departures, such as those based on the defendant's criminal history, the defendant's substantial assistance to authorities, and early disposition programs, are addressed elsewhere in the guidelines.

As acknowledged by Congress in the Sentencing Reform Act and by the Commission when the first set of guidelines was promulgated, "it is difficult to prescribe a single set of guidelines that encompasses the vast range of human conduct potentially relevant to a sentencing decision." (See Chapter One, Part A). Departures, therefore, perform an integral function in the sentencing guideline system. Departures permit courts to impose an appropriate sentence in the exceptional case in which mechanical application of the guidelines would fail to achieve the statutory purposes and goals of sentencing. Departures also help maintain "sufficient flexibility to permit individualized sentences when warranted by mitigating or aggravating factors not taken into account in the establishment of general sentencing practices." 28 U.S.C. § 991(b)(1)(B). By monitoring when courts depart from the guidelines and by analyzing their stated reasons for doing so, along with appellate cases reviewing these departures, the Commission can further refine the guidelines to specify more precisely when departures should and should not be permitted.

As reaffirmed in the Prosecutorial Remedies and Other Tools to end the Exploitation of Children Today Act of 2003 (the "PROTECT Act", Public Law 108–21), circumstances warranting departure should be rare. Departures were never intended to permit sentencing courts to substitute their policy judgments for those of Congress and the Sentencing Commission. Departure in such circumstances would produce unwarranted sentencing disparity, which the Sentencing Reform Act was designed to avoid.

In order for appellate courts to fulfill their statutory duties under 18 U.S.C. § 3742 and for the Commission to fulfill its ongoing responsibility to refine the guidelines in light of information it receives on departures, it is essential that sentencing courts state with specificity the reasons for departure, as required by the PROTECT Act.

This policy statement, including its commentary, was substantially revised, effective October 27, 2003, in response to directives contained in the PROTECT Act, particularly the directive in section 401(m) of that Act to–

"(1) review the grounds of downward departure that are authorized by the sentencing guidelines, policy statements, and official commentary of the Sentencing Commission and
(2) promulgate, pursuant to section 994 of title 28, United States Code—
(A) appropriate amendments to the sentencing guidelines, policy statements, and official commentary to ensure that the incidence of downward departures is substantially reduced
(B) a policy statement authorizing a departure pursuant to an early disposition program and
(C) any other conforming amendments to the sentencing guidelines, policy statements, and official commentary of the Sentencing Commission necessitated by the Act, including a revision of . section 5K2.0".

The substantial revision of this policy statement in response to the PROTECT Act was intended to refine the standards applicable to departures while giving due regard for concepts, such as the "heartland", that have evolved in departure jurisprudence over time.

Section 401(b)(1) of the PROTECT Act directly amended this policy statement to add subsection (b), effective April 30, 2003.

Historical Note: Effective November 1, 1987. Amended effective June 15, 1988 (amendment 57) November 1, 1990 (amendment 358) November 1, 1994 (amendment 508) November 1, 1997 (amendment 561) November 1, 1998 (amendment 585) April 30, 2003 (amendment 649) October 27, 2003 (amendment 651) November 1, 2008 (amendment 725) November 1, 2010 (amendment 739) November 1, 2011 (amendment 757) November 1, 2012 (amendment 770).

§5K2.1. Death (Policy Statement)

If death resulted, the court may increase the sentence above the authorized guideline range.

Loss of life does not automatically suggest a sentence at or near the statutory maximum. The sentencing judge must give consideration to matters that would normally distinguish among levels of homicide, such as the defendant's state of mind and the degree of planning or preparation. Other appropriate factors are whether multiple deaths resulted, and the means by which life was taken. The extent of the increase should depend on the dangerousness of the defendant's conduct, the extent to which death or serious injury was intended or knowingly risked, and the extent to which the offense level for the offense of conviction, as determined by the other Chapter Two guidelines, already reflects the risk of personal injury. For example, a substantial increase may be appropriate if the death was intended or knowingly risked or if the underlying offense was one for which base offense levels do not reflect an allowance for the risk of personal injury, such as fraud.

Historical Note: Effective November 1, 1987.

§5K2.2. Physical Injury (Policy Statement)

If significant physical injury resulted, the court may increase the sentence above the authorized guideline range. The extent of the increase ordinarily should depend on the extent of the injury, the degree to which it may prove permanent, and the extent to which the injury was intended or knowingly risked. When the victim suffers a major, permanent disability and when such injury was intentionally inflicted, a substantial departure may be appropriate. If the injury is less serious or if the defendant (though criminally negligent) did not knowingly create the risk of harm, a less substantial departure would be indicated. In general, the same considerations apply as in §5K2.1.

Historical Note: Effective November 1, 1987.

§5K2.3. Extreme Psychological Injury (Policy Statement)

If a victim or victims suffered psychological injury much more serious than that normally resulting from commission of the offense, the court may increase the sentence above the authorized guideline range. The extent of the increase ordinarily should depend on the severity of the psychological injury and the extent to which the injury was intended or knowingly risked.

Normally, psychological injury would be sufficiently severe to warrant application of this adjustment only when there is a substantial impairment of the intellectual, psychological, emotional, or behavioral functioning of a victim, when the impairment is likely to be of an extended or continuous duration, and when the impairment manifests itself by physical or psychological symptoms or by changes in behavior patterns. The court should consider the extent to which such harm was likely, given the nature of the defendant's conduct.

Historical Note: Effective November 1, 1987.

§5K2.4. Abduction or Unlawful Restraint (Policy Statement)

If a person was abducted, taken hostage, or unlawfully restrained to facilitate commission of the offense or to facilitate the escape from the scene of the crime, the court may increase the sentence above the authorized guideline range.

Historical Note: Effective November 1, 1987.

§5K2.5. Property Damage or Loss (Policy Statement)

If the offense caused property damage or loss not taken into account within the guidelines, the court may increase the sentence above the authorized guideline range. The extent of the increase ordinarily should depend on the extent to which the harm was intended or knowingly risked and on the extent to which the harm to property is more serious than other harm caused or risked by the conduct relevant to the offense of conviction.

Historical Note: Effective November 1, 1987.

§5K2.6. Weapons and Dangerous Instrumentalities (Policy Statement)

If a weapon or dangerous instrumentality was used or possessed in the commission of the offense the court may increase the sentence above the authorized guideline range. The extent of the increase ordinarily should depend on the dangerousness of the weapon, the manner in which it was used, and the extent to which its use endangered others. The discharge of a firearm might warrant a substantial sentence increase.

Historical Note: Effective November 1, 1987.

§5K2.7. Disruption of Governmental Function (Policy Statement)

If the defendant's conduct resulted in a significant disruption of a governmental function, the court may increase the sentence above the authorized guideline range to reflect the nature and extent of the disruption and the importance of the governmental function affected. Departure from the guidelines ordinarily would not be justified when the offense of conviction is an offense such as bribery or obstruction of justice in such cases interference with a governmental function is inherent in the offense, and unless the circumstances are unusual the guidelines will reflect the appropriate punishment for such interference.

Historical Note: Effective November 1, 1987.

§5K2.8. Extreme Conduct (Policy Statement)

If the defendant's conduct was unusually heinous, cruel, brutal, or degrading to the victim, the court may increase the sentence above the guideline range to reflect the nature of the conduct. Examples of extreme conduct include torture of a victim, gratuitous infliction of injury, or prolonging of pain or humiliation.

Historical Note: Effective November 1, 1987.

§5K2.9. Criminal Purpose (Policy Statement)

If the defendant committed the offense in order to facilitate or conceal the commission of another offense, the court may increase the sentence above the guideline range to reflect the actual seriousness of the defendant's conduct.

Historical Note: Effective November 1, 1987.

§5K2.10. Victim's Conduct (Policy Statement)

If the victim's wrongful conduct contributed significantly to provoking the offense behavior, the court may reduce the sentence below the guideline range to reflect the nature and circumstances of the offense. In deciding whether a sentence reduction is warranted, and the extent of such reduction, the court should consider the following:

(1) The size and strength of the victim, or other relevant physical characteristics, in comparison with those of the defendant.

(2) The persistence of the victim's conduct and any efforts by the defendant to prevent confrontation.

(3) The danger reasonably perceived by the defendant, including the victim's reputation for violence.

(4) The danger actually presented to the defendant by the victim.

(5) Any other relevant conduct by the victim that substantially contributed to the danger presented.

(6) The proportionality and reasonableness of the defendant's response to the victim's provocation.

Victim misconduct ordinarily would not be sufficient to warrant application of this provision in the context of offenses under Chapter Two, Part A, Subpart 3 (Criminal Sexual Abuse). In addition, this provision usually would not be relevant in the context of non-violent offenses. There may, however, be unusual circumstances in which substantial victim misconduct would warrant a reduced penalty in the case of a non-violent offense. For example, an extended course of provocation and harassment might lead a defendant to steal or destroy property in retaliation.

Historical Note: Effective November 1, 1987. Amended effective October 27, 2003 (amendment 651).

§5K2.11. Lesser Harms (Policy Statement)

Sometimes, a defendant may commit a crime in order to avoid a perceived greater harm. In such instances, a reduced sentence may be appropriate, provided that the circumstances significantly diminish society's interest in punishing the conduct, for example, in the case of a mercy killing. Where the interest in punishment or deterrence is not reduced, a reduction in sentence is not warranted. For example, providing defense secrets to a hostile power should receive no lesser punishment simply because the defendant believed that the government's policies were misdirected.

In other instances, conduct may not cause or threaten the harm or evil sought to be prevented by the law proscribing the offense at issue. For example, where a war veteran possessed a machine gun or grenade as a trophy, or a school teacher possessed controlled substances for display in a drug education program, a reduced sentence might be warranted.

Historical Note: Effective November 1, 1987.

§5K2.12. Coercion and Duress (Policy Statement)

If the defendant committed the offense because of serious coercion, blackmail or duress, under circumstances not amounting to a complete defense, the court may depart downward. The extent of the decrease ordinarily should depend on the reasonableness of the defendant's actions, on the proportionality of the defendant's actions to the seriousness of coercion, blackmail, or duress involved, and on the extent to which the conduct would have been less harmful under the circumstances as the defendant believed them to be. Ordinarily coercion will be sufficiently serious to warrant departure only when it involves a threat of physical injury, substantial damage to property or similar injury resulting from the unlawful action of a third party or from a natural emergency. Notwithstanding this policy statement, personal financial difficulties and economic pressures upon a trade or business do not warrant a downward departure.

Historical Note: Effective November 1, 1987. Amended effective October 27, 2003 (amendment 651) November 1, 2004 (674).

§5K2.13. Diminished Capacity (Policy Statement)

A downward departure may be warranted if (1) the defendant committed the offense while suffering from a significantly reduced mental capacity and (2) the significantly reduced mental capacity contributed substantially to the commission of the offense. Similarly, if a departure is warranted under this policy statement, the extent of the departure should reflect the extent to which the reduced mental capacity contributed to the commission of the offense.

However, the court may not depart below the applicable guideline range if (1) the significantly reduced mental capacity was caused by the voluntary use of drugs or other intoxicants (2) the facts and circumstances of the defendant's offense indicate a need to protect the public because the offense involved actual violence or a serious threat of violence (3) the defendant's criminal history indicates a need to incarcerate the defendant to protect the public or (4) the defendant has been convicted of an offense under chapter 71, 109A, 110, or 117, of title 18, United States Code.

1. For purposes of this policy statement–

"Significantly reduced mental capacity" means the defendant, although convicted, has a significantly impaired ability to (A) understand the wrongfulness of the behavior comprising the offense or to exercise the power of reason or (B) control behavior that the defendant knows is wrongful.

Background: Section 401(b)(5) of Public Law 108–21 directly amended this policy statement to add subdivision (4), effective April 30, 2003.

Historical Note: Effective November 1, 1987. Amended effective November 1, 1998 (amendment 583) April 30, 2003 (amendment 649) October 27, 2003 (amendment 651) November 1, 2004 (amendment 674).

§5K2.14. Public Welfare (Policy Statement)

If national security, public health, or safety was significantly endangered, the court may depart upward to reflect the nature and circumstances of the offense.

Historical Note: Effective November 1, 1987. Amended effective November 1, 2004 (amendment 674).

§5K2.15. [Deleted]

Historical Note: Section 5K2.15 (Terrorism (Policy Statement)), effective November 1, 1989 (amendment 292), was deleted effective November 1, 1995 (amendment 526).

§5K2.16. Voluntary Disclosure of Offense (Policy Statement)

If the defendant voluntarily discloses to authorities the existence of, and accepts responsibility for, the offense prior to the discovery of such offense, and if such offense was unlikely to have been discovered otherwise, a downward departure may be warranted. For example, a downward departure under this section might be considered where a defendant, motivated by remorse, discloses an offense that otherwise would have remained undiscovered. This provision does not apply where the motivating factor is the defendant's knowledge that discovery of the offense is likely or imminent, or where the defendant's disclosure occurs in connection with the investigation or prosecution of the defendant for related conduct.

Historical Note: Effective November 1, 1991 (amendment 420). Amended effective November 1, 2004 (amendment 674).

§5K2.17. Semiautomatic Firearms Capable of Accepting Large Capacity Magazine (Policy Statement)

If the defendant possessed a semiautomatic firearm capable of accepting a large capacity magazine in connection with a crime of violence or controlled substance offense, an upward departure may be warranted. A "semiautomatic firearm capable of accepting a large capacity magazine" means a semiautomatic firearm that has the ability to fire many rounds without reloading because at the time of the offense (1) the firearm had attached to it a magazine or similar device that could accept more than 15 rounds of ammunition or (2) a magazine or similar device that could accept more than 15 rounds of ammunition was in close proximity to the firearm. The extent of any increase should depend upon the degree to which the nature of the weapon increased the likelihood of death or injury in the circumstances of the particular case.

1. "Crime of violence" and "controlled substance offense" are defined in §4B1.2 (Definitions of Terms Used in Section 4B1.1).

Historical Note: Effective November 1, 1995 (amendment 531). Amended effective November 1, 2006 (amendment 691) November 1, 2010 (amendment 746).

§5K2.18. Violent Street Gangs (Policy Statement)

If the defendant is subject to an enhanced sentence under 18 U.S.C. § 521 (pertaining to criminal street gangs), an upward departure may be warranted. The purpose of this departure provision is to enhance the sentences of defendants who participate in groups, clubs, organizations, or associations that use violence to further their ends. It is to be noted that there may be cases in which 18 U.S.C. § 521 applies, but no violence is established. In such cases, it is expected that the guidelines will account adequately for the conduct and, consequently, this departure provision would not apply.

Historical Note: Effective November 1, 1995 (amendment 532).

§5K2.19. [Deleted]

Historical Note: Section 5K2.19 (Post-Sentencing Rehabilitative Efforts) (Policy Statement), effective November 1, 2000 (amendment 602), was deleted effective November 1, 2012 (amendment 768).

§5K2.20. Aberrant Behavior (Policy Statement)

(a) IN GENERAL.—Except where a defendant is convicted of an offense involving a minor victim under section 1201, an offense under section 1591, or an offense under chapter 71, 109A, 110, or 117, of title 18, United States Code, a downward departure may be warranted in an exceptional case if (1) the defendant's criminal conduct meets the requirements of subsection (b) and (2) the departure is not prohibited under subsection (c).

(b) REQUIREMENTS.—The court may depart downward under this policy statement only if the defendant committed a single criminal occurrence or single criminal transaction that (1) was committed without significant planning (2) was of limited duration and (3) represents a marked deviation by the defendant from an otherwise law-abiding life.

(c) PROHIBITIONS BASED ON THE PRESENCE OF CERTAIN CIRCUMSTANCES.—The court may not depart downward pursuant to this policy statement if any of the following circumstances are present:

(1) The offense involved serious bodily injury or death.

(2) The defendant discharged a firearm or otherwise used a firearm or a dangerous weapon.

(3) The instant offense of conviction is a serious drug trafficking offense.

(4) The defendant has either of the following: (A) more than one criminal history point, as determined under Chapter Four (Criminal History and Criminal Livelihood) before application of subsection (b) of §4A1.3 (Departures Based on Inadequacy of Criminal History Category) or (B) a prior federal or state felony conviction, or any other significant prior criminal behavior, regardless of whether the conviction or significant prior criminal behavior is countable under Chapter Four.

1. Definitions.—For purposes of this policy statement:

"Dangerous weapon," "firearm," "otherwise used," and "serious bodily injury" have the meaning given those terms in the Commentary to §1B1.1 (Application Instructions).

"Serious drug trafficking offense" means any controlled substance offense under title 21, United States Code, other than simple possession under 21 U.S.C. § 844, that provides for a mandatory minimum term of imprisonment of five years or greater, regardless of whether the defendant meets the criteria of §5C1.2 (Limitation on Applicability of Statutory Mandatory Minimum Sentences in Certain Cases).

2. Repetitious or Significant, Planned Behavior.—Repetitious or significant, planned behavior does not meet the requirements of subsection (b). For example, a fraud scheme generally would not meet such requirements because such a scheme usually involves repetitive acts, rather than a single occurrence or single criminal transaction, and significant planning.

3. Other Circumstances to Consider.—In determining whether the court should depart under this policy statement, the court may consider the defendant's (A) mental and emotional conditions (B) employment record (C) record of prior good works (D) motivation for committing the offense and (E) efforts to mitigate the effects of the offense.

Background: Section 401(b)(3) of Public Law 108–21 directly amended subsection (a) of this policy statement, effective April 30, 2003.

Historical Note: Effective November 1, 2000 (amendment 603). Amended effective April 30, 2003 (amendment 649) October 27, 2003 (amendment 651).

§5K2.21. Dismissed and Uncharged Conduct (Policy Statement)

The court may depart upward to reflect the actual seriousness of the offense based on conduct (1) underlying a charge dismissed as part of a plea agreement in the case, or underlying a potential charge not pursued in the case as part of a plea agreement or for any other reason and (2) that did not enter into the determination of the applicable guideline range.

Historical Note: Effective November 1, 2000 (amendment 604). Amended effective November 1, 2004 (amendment 674).

§5K2.22. Specific Offender Characteristics as Grounds for Downward Departure in Child Crimes and Sexual Offenses (Policy Statement)

In sentencing a defendant convicted of an offense involving a minor victim under section 1201, an offense under section 1591, or an offense under chapter 71, 109A, 110, or 117, of title 18, United States Code:

(1) Age may be a reason to depart downward only if and to the extent permitted by §5H1.1.

(2) An extraordinary physical impairment may be a reason to depart downward only if and to the extent permitted by §5H1.4.

(3) Drug, alcohol, or gambling dependence or abuse is not a reason to depart downward.

Background: Section 401(b)(2) of Public Law 108–21 directly amended Chapter Five, Part K, to add this policy statement, effective April 30, 2003.

Historical Note: Effective April 30, 2003 (amendment 649). Amended effective November 1, 2004 (amendment 674).

§5K2.23. Discharged Terms of Imprisonment (Policy Statement)

A downward departure may be appropriate if the defendant (1) has completed serving a term of imprisonment and (2) subsection (b) of §5G1.3 (Imposition of a Sentence on a Defendant Subject to Undischarged Term of Imprisonment or Anticipated Term of Imprisonment) would have provided an adjustment had that completed term of imprisonment been undischarged at the time of sentencing for the instant offense. Any such departure should be fashioned to achieve a reasonable punishment for the instant offense.

Historical Note: Effective November 1, 2003 (amendment 660). Amended effective November 1, 2004 (amendment 674) November 1, 2014 (amendment 787).

§5K2.24. Commission of Offense While Wearing or Displaying Unauthorized or Counterfeit Insignia or Uniform (Policy Statement)

If, during the commission of the offense, the defendant wore or displayed an official, or counterfeit official, insignia or uniform received in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 716, an upward departure may be warranted.

1. Definition.—For purposes of this policy statement, "official insignia or uniform" has the meaning given that term in 18 U.S.C. § 716(c)(3).

Historical Note: Effective November 1, 2007 (amendment 700).

3. EARLY DISPOSITION PROGRAMS

Historical Note: Effective October 27, 2003 (amendment 651).

§5K3.1. Early Disposition Programs (Policy Statement)

Upon motion of the Government, the court may depart downward not more than 4 levels pursuant to an early disposition program authorized by the Attorney General of the United States and the United States Attorney for the district in which the court resides.

Background: This policy statement implements the directive to the Commission in section 401(m)(2)(B) of the Prosecutorial Remedies and Other Tools to end the Exploitation of Children Today Act of 2003 (the "PROTECT Act", Public Law 108–21).


What happened next …

By the end of the sixteenth century some were arguing for a new solution to criminal sentencing: transporting convicts to the North American colonies. In 1615 James I decreed transportation to be a lawful penalty for crime. But it was not often used until 1718, when new legislation confirmed it as a valid sentence and required the state to pay for it. Until about 1790 transportation remained the preferred sentence for noncapital offenses it could also be imposed instead of the death penalty. The vast majority of transported convicts were men, most of them in their twenties, who were sent to the colonies of Maryland and Virginia. By 1772, three-fifths of English male convicts were transported. During the late 1780s, when England was at war with France, it became common practice to force convicts into service on naval ships. After 1815 transportation resumed—this time to Australia, which became, in effect, a penal colony. About 187,000 convicts were sent there from 1815 to 1840, when transportation was abolished.

Imprisonment did not become a regularly imposed sentence in England until the late 1700s. Even then, only about ten percent of English convicts were sent to prison. In 1853 the Penal Servitude Act formally instituted the modern prison system in Britain.

From around the late 1700s the government sought more humane ways to conduct executions. Rather than inflict physical suffering on the condemned person, as was the custom in earlier times, the government became more concerned about the rights of the prisoner. In Scotland, for example, an early type of guillotine was invented to replace beheadings by axe since it could often take two or more axe blows to sever a head, this guillotine was considered a relatively merciful method of execution. Better ways to conduct hangings were also developed, so that condemned prisoners died quickly instead of being slowly strangled on the gallows.

The Capital Punishment within Prisons Bill of 1868 abolished public hangings in Britain, and required that executions take place within the prison. The death penalty was abolished in England in 1965, except for treason, piracy with violence, and a type of arson. In 1998 the Criminal Justice Bill ended the death penalty for those crimes as well.


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From stocks to ducking stools: A British history of crime and punishment

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In historic Britain punishments meted out were often painful and horrifying[ALAMY]

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With punishments for the guilty ranging from the humiliation of a spell in the stocks to the very real prospect of a horrifyingly painful execution it is hard to imagine why anybody resorted to a life of crime. Many Britons did though and a new book tells the story of how they were caught, tried and punished.

PUT 'EM IN THE CLINK

Before the 19th century criminals were rarely sentenced to prison. They were expensive to build, no one wanted one in their backyard and it seemed a nonsense to waste money on criminals. The purpose of a prison was to hold prisoners until their trials before magistrates or a judge and jury.

Prior to judges, magistrates and juries being introduced by Henry II in the 12th century trial by ordeal was a common method of establishing guilt or innocence.

Trial by fire: This involved walking across hot coals or holding a red-hot piece of metal. After about three days the wounds would be examined by a priest who would decide whether the healing process had advanced sufficiently to show that God had intervened favourably. If not, the suspect would be found guilty.

Trial by water: This took two forms. The first required the suspect to remove a stone from the bottom of a cauldron of boiling water following which a priest would decide whether the injuries were consistent with guilt or innocence. The other form, known as ordeal by cold water, involved the accused being thrown into a river or pond, sometimes bound hand and foot. If he floated he was innocent and if he sank he would drown. Trials of this type ended in 1215 when Pope Innocent III prohibited priests from participating in them.

WHAT TO DO WITH THE CONVICTS

In the absence of prisoners being sent to prison there were a number of other sentences that were handed down:

Fines: Commonly imposed for petty offences including swearing, playing a prohibited musical instrument or playing sport on the sabbath. Tradesmen who sold defective produce could also be fined but humiliation was an alternative punishment. For example, a baker whose loaves were underweight would be paraded around the town with the offending merchandise and forced to wear a placard around his neck describing his offence.

The Stocks: Held by their ankles offenders were sometimes detained in the stocks for hours before their appearances in court. In 1384 two defendants failed to appear for their trials because they had been put in the stocks and forgotten. Their feet froze and they died. The stocks were mainly used as a punishment for petty offences and remained in use until 1872.

The pillory: Similar to the stocks but victims were held by the wrists and neck leaving them in a vulnerable position.

The ducking stool: This was a punishment used for women - commonly for prostitutes and scolds. Mutilation: Included branding, cutting off hands, feet, nose, ears, lips, tongue or the removal of eyes.

Almost 300 offences were subject to capital punishment ranging from theft of goods worth 5s (25p) and impersonating a Chelsea pensioner

THE OLD BAILEY

The Old Bailey is mentioned in records in the reign of Elizabeth I. It was originally called the Middlesex Sessions House and was intended for the trials of those accused of crimes in the City of London and Middlesex. In 1834 it was renamed the Central Criminal Court.

THE ULTIMATE DEATH

Death was the ultimate penalty and by the end of the 18th century almost 300 offences were subject to capital punishment ranging from theft of goods worth 5s (25p) and impersonating a Chelsea pensioner to arson, murder and treason.

When the death sentence was passed there were many ways of carrying it out.

Beheading: The "kindest" form of execution if carried out by a proficient executioner because it was instant.

Hanging: The usual fate of common criminals. It was normally done in public until 1868, the best-known site being Tyburn (London's Marble Arch). Afterwards they were carried out within prisons before witnesses.

Burning at the stake: This was the fate of heretics and women who were convicted of murdering their husbands or counterfeiting money. Boiling: Reserved for those who murdered or attempted to murder a master. This was a special offence known as "petty treason".

Hung, drawn and quartered: A grisly punishment mostly inflicted on captured rebels and other traitors including William Wallace and the conspirators in the Gunpowder Plot. The victim would be dragged on a frame from the prison to the place of execution. There they would be hanged until almost dead before being disembowelled and decapitated and their head shoved on a spike. This punishment was last used in the 1820s on the Cato Street conspirators who had plotted to overthrow the government. Pressing: If a prisoner pleaded not guilty and was found guilty then his possessions passed to the state. If he refused to enter a plea then his family retained his possessions. The cruelty of being pressed to death was therefore designed to ensure a plea from the accused.

THE EXECUTIONERS

Two executioners' names have come down to us from the 17th century. The first is that of Goodman Derrick who designed a structure to hoist several victims simultaneously. His name later applied to the Derrick crane for loading and unloading ships.

The other is the name of Jack Ketch. He was notably incompetent and took four blows to despatch William Russell for his part in the plot to kill Charles II.

GINGERBREAD FOR SALE

At Tyburn execution site the density and excitement of the crowd was such that onlookers were sometimes trampled. Tyburn was also a market and a crime scene since traders like the gingerbread maker Tiddy Doll plied their wares and the crowds attracted a multitude of pickpockets.

GET OUT OF JAIL FREE

If all else failed a fugitive from justice could always seek sanctuary a stone's throw from London's Newgate Prison. In 1056, in the reign of Edward the Confessor, two of the king's cousins founded the College of St Martin-Le-Grand. From 1439 it offered sanctuary to criminals, though traitors were turned away. Well-informed criminals continued to take advantage of this opportunity to escape the axe, the noose or worse until the arrangement came to an end in 1697.

THE LAST WITCH

The last person to be prosecuted under the Witchcraft Act was Helen Duncan who, in 1944, claimed to commune with the spirit of a sailor who had died on the HMS Barham in 1941, the loss of which had not been made public. An intelligence officer feared that she would reveal the plans for the D-Day invasion so she was arrested during a seance and jailed for nine months.


Watch the video: Why should you read Crime and Punishment? - Alex Gendler (July 2022).


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